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NECESSITY AS A CHECK ON STATE EMINENT DOMAIN POWER 
Robert C. Bird* & Lynda J. Oswald** 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court decision of Kelo v. City of New London has provoked rigorous debate over 
the proper discretion given to government entities exercising powers of eminent domain.  Rarely 
discussed is the equally important requirement of necessity.  The necessity doctrine requires that a 
condemnor justify that the proposed taking is reasonably necessary for the stated purpose.  Few 
attorneys and even fewer scholars have discussed the role of necessity doctrine in modern eminent 
domain practice.  This manuscript traces the history and development of necessity, discusses cases 
where courts have prevented takings for lack of sufficient necessity, and suggests opportunities for 
practitioners to better challenge eminent domain proceedings.  This manuscript concludes that 
necessity should be revived from its largely dormant state and can play a meaningful role in 
curbing the worst excesses of eminent domain. 
 
This Article examines a largely ignored aspect of eminent domain:  
“necessity.”  The necessity doctrine requires that a condemnor justify 
a proposed taking as necessary for furthering a proposed public use.1  
In some states, the doctrine is created explicitly through constitu-
tional or statutory provisions; in others, the courts have found it to be 
an implicit constraint on condemnation arising from the state’s con-
stitutional or statutory structure.2  Necessity determinations implicate 
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 1 See City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 15 (Nev. 2003) (“In 
an eminent domain proceeding, necessity is usually raised in the context of challenging 
whether a project furthers a public purpose and therefore constitutes a public use.  It in-
volves whether the property to be taken is necessary to accomplish the public purpose 
and it encompasses the selection of the location of the condemned land.” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
 2 See 71 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 2 (2008) (noting that to constitute a valid exercise of 
eminent domain power, “private property can only be taken out of ‘necessity’ to accom-
plish an identified ‘public purpose’”). 
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not only narrow considerations, such as the selection of the specific 
land to be condemned for the public use, but also the much broader 
and often contentious question of whether the exercise of the emi-
nent domain power is actually needed to further the public purpose 
at stake.3 
While necessity is a counterpart to the more analyzed and well-
known public use doctrine, it is analytically distinct and raises differ-
ent concerns.  Those differences are significant.  Public use has been 
thoroughly explored in both court opinions and the legal literature, 
particularly in the context of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 decision 
in Kelo v. City of New London.4  By contrast, although courts often refer 
 
 3 Id. § 1 (discussing necessity as “involv[ing] whether the property to be taken is necessary 
to accomplish the public purpose and encompasses the selection of the location of the 
condemned land”). 
 4 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  In Kelo, the Supreme Court ruled that the city’s use of eminent do-
main to condemn private property for the purpose of economic redevelopment through 
private enterprise ownership constituted a valid “public use” within the meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.  Id. at 488–90.  Kelo examined the breadth of what 
constitutes a permissible public use that suffices for takings under eminent domain.  The 
public use doctrine has already been, and in the future will likely continue to be, the sub-
ject of extensive scholarly commentary.  See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, 
Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN. L. REV. 871 (2007); Richard O. Brooks, Kelo and the 
“Whaling City”:  The Failure of the Supreme Court’s Opportunity to Articulate a Public Purpose of 
Sustainability, in THE SUPREME COURT AND TAKINGS:  FOUR ESSAYS 5 (2006), available at 
http://www.vjel.org/takings/Brooks_article.pdf; Steven J. Eagle & Lauren A. Perotti, Cop-
ing with Kelo:  A Potpourri of Legislative and Judicial Responses, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 
799 (2008); Clayton P. Gillette, Kelo and the Local Political Process, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13 
(2005); Scott Griswold, Property Rights vs. Public Use:  Analyzing Tennessee’s Response to Kelo 
Eminent Domain Ruling, 43 TENN. B.J. 14 (2007); George Lefcoe, Redevelopment Takings Af-
ter Kelo:  What’s Blight Got to Do With It?, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 803 (2008); Carol 
J. Miller & Stanley A. Leasure, Post-Kelo Determination of Public Use and Eminent Domain in 
Economic Development Under Arkansas Law, 59 ARK. L. REV. 43 (2006); David Schultz, Eco-
nomic Development and Eminent Domain after Kelo:  Property Rights and “Public Use” Under State 
Constitutions, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 41 (2006); David Schultz, What’s Yours Can Be 
Mine:  Are There Any Private Takings After Kelo v. City of New London?, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 195 (2006); Mark Seidenfeld, In Search of Robin Hood:  Suggested Legislative Re-
sponses to Kelo, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 305 (2008); Christopher Serkin, Local Property 
Law:  Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV 883 (2007); Viola Vetter, 
Kelo:  Midkiff’s Latest Victim, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 257 (2006); Lucas J. Asper, 
Comment, The Fair Market Value Method of Property Valuation in Eminent Domain:  “Just Com-
pensation” or Just Barely Compensating?, 58 S.C. L. REV. 489 (2007); Justin Morgan Crane, 
Note & Comment, The Privatization of Public Use:  Why Rational Basis Review of a Private 
Property Condemnation is a Violation of a Fundamental Civil Right, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 511 
(2006); Ashley J. Fuhrmeister, Note, In the Name of Economic Development:  Reviving “Public 
Use” as a Limitation on the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London, 
54 DRAKE L. REV. 171 (2005); Scott P. Ledet, Comment, The Kelo Effect:  Eminent Domain 
and Property Rights in Louisiana, 67 LA. L. REV. 171 (2006); James J. Ferrelli, Eminent Do-
main in New Jersey After Kelo:  What’s Next?, N.J. LAW., Dec. 2005, at 44. 
   Interestingly, the Kelo trial court found that part of the parcels at issue in the case 
could not be taken because there was no necessity for the taking.  See Kelo v. City of New 
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to necessity in the context of evaluating takings, they seldom discuss it 
extensively and only the occasional court has refused to allow a taking 
to proceed because of lack of necessity.  However, with the public use 
limitation on the takings power diminished by Kelo, necessity is one of 
the few remaining potential checks on the eminent domain power.  
The doctrine warrants further analysis and heightened attention by 
courts and scholars. 
Part I of this Article outlines the history and development of emi-
nent domain necessity jurisprudence.  This Part reviews the com-
ments of treatise writers as well as examines the historical origins of 
modern necessity doctrine.  We find that necessity questions have 
traditionally been left to the judgment of the legislature and that ne-
cessity and public use rules are sometimes conflated. 
Part II examines successful necessity challenges to takings on the 
grounds that the proposed plan was too remote or speculative.5  This 
Part discusses cases in which courts have concluded that planners 
have failed to show necessity to condemn because of a vague plan, 
uncertain timing of the execution of that plan, and other considera-
tions.  Part III examines successful challenges on the basis that pro-
cedural or regulatory hurdles impeding development make the gov-
ernment’s plan not viable on necessity grounds.  We conclude that 
this long dormant cousin of “public use” has significant potential for 
landowners as a defense to eminent domain takings. 
I.  THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NECESSITY DOCTRINE 
Early eminent domain cases arose primarily in the state courts, 
under either state statutory or constitutional law.  Because of these 
state law origins, the legal rules pertaining to eminent domain dis-
played considerable variety in their early stages.  By the early nine-
 
London, No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002).  The Connecti-
cut Supreme Court reversed, finding that the legislature’s determination was entitled to 
deference.  843 A.2d 500, 572 (Conn. 2004).  The U.S. Supreme Court, of course, framed 
the case as raising an issue of public use.  545 U.S. at 472. 
 5 A natural progression would be to focus first on the role of necessity in federal eminent 
domain proceedings.  However, federal courts have long deemed necessity review of fed-
eral proceedings beyond the purview of the judicial function and the sole provenance of 
the legislature.  See, e.g., Adirondack Ry. Co. v. New York, 176 U.S. 335, 349 (1900) (“The 
general rule is that the necessity or expediency of appropriating particular property for 
public use is not a matter of judicial cognizance but one for the determination of the leg-
islative branch of the government . . . .”); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878) 
(“When the use is public, the necessity or expediency of appropriating any particular 
property is not a subject of judicial cognizance.”).  Instead, we focus our efforts in this ar-
ticle on the diverse interpretations of necessity in state courts. 
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teenth century, however, the basic principles underlying the modern 
framework of eminent domain law had begun to emerge and coa-
lesce.6  As part of this natural evolution and development in legal 
doctrine, courts clarified the role of “necessity” in the takings deci-
sion-making process. 
From the outset, American legal doctrine recognized that the sov-
ereign has an inherent power of eminent domain;7 i.e., the power “of 
taking or of authorizing the taking of any property within its jurisdic-
tion for the public good.”8  This historical view of eminent domain as 
an inherent power necessarily colors the law’s perception of the outer 
limits of the power.  Thus, the constitutional provisions that address 
eminent domain are couched in terms of limitations on this sover-
eign power (i.e., that the taking be for a public “use” or “purpose” 
and that just compensation be paid), and not in terms of an express 
 
 6 See generally Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by the 
Government, 1789–1910, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER:  HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 132, 133 (L. Friedman & H. Scheiber eds., 1978) (describing the history of 
eminent domain law); J.A.C. Grant, The “Higher Law” Background of the Law of Eminent Do-
main, 6 WIS. L. REV. 67 (1931) (discussing how courts dealt with the question of whether 
“higher law” guaranteed compensation for takings throughout history); William B. Stoe-
buck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972) (developing a 
framework for analyzing eminent domain principles).  It was only in 1875 that the U.S. 
Supreme Court definitively ruled that the federal government had an eminent domain 
power of its own. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372 (1875) (holding that the 
postal power includes power to obtain sites for post offices by eminent domain); see also 1 
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.24 (Julius L. Sackman ed., rev. 3d ed. 2007) [hereinaf-
ter NICHOLS 3d] (discussing history and development of federal government’s eminent 
domain power).  In addition, before the Fifth Amendment’s limitation on federal takings 
was extended to the states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
in 1896, state takings were seldom reviewed in federal court.  See Lawrence Berger, The 
Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 207 (1978) (noting that “the 
use of condemnation to open private roads from one person’s land across the property of 
others to the public roads was a necessity if the country was to be developed” and conse-
quently, a fully developed system of condemnation evolved which federal courts rarely re-
viewed); Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain:  An Advance Requiem, 58 
YALE L.J. 599, 599–600 n.4 (1949) (noting that the Fifth Amendment Eminent Domain 
Clause is “not directly applicable to the states”). 
 7 According to the U.S. Supreme Court’s classic statement, the taking power is a “political 
necessity” because “[s]uch an authority is essential to [the sovereign’s] independent exis-
tence and perpetuity.”  Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371; see also 1 JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 672 (3d ed. 1909) (“The power of eminent 
domain, being an incident of sovereignty, is inherent in the federal government and in 
the several States, by virtue of their sovereignty.”); id. at 7 (“[T]he power of eminent do-
main is not a reversed [sic] [power], but an inherent right, a right which pertains to sov-
ereignty as a necessary, constant and inextinguishable attribute.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 8 1 PHILIP NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN:  A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES WHICH 
AFFECT THE TAKING OF PROPERTY FOR THE PUBLIC USE 1 (2d ed. 1917) [hereinafter 
NICHOLS 2d]. 
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grant of the power to take in the first place.9  Because of the pre-
dominance of this early view of the eminent domain power as being 
inherent within the sovereign,10 it is not surprising that necessity de-
terminations were also deemed to lie within the discretion of the leg-
islature, and that the courts’ role in making such determinations was 
historically constrained. 
A. Historical Development of the Role of Necessity Within Eminent Domain 
Doctrine 
Modern notions of eminent domain did not arise until after the 
decline of the feudal system in Europe.11  The timing was logical and 
natural, as eminent domain was unnecessary in feudal societies, 
where the sovereign was the ultimate owner of all land such that the 
confiscation of land for a public improvement “would not . . . involve 
the taking of property in its modern sense.”12  Although the decline of 
feudalism and the concomitant rise of individual property ownership 
and recognition of private property rights ultimately gave rise to 
 
 9 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”).  None of the early state constitutions explicitly granted the power of 
eminent domain to the states.  See 1 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 58 (“The provisions 
found in most of the state constitutions relating to the taking of property for the public 
use therefore do not by implication grant the power of eminent domain to the govern-
ment of the state, but they limit a power already existing which would otherwise be unlim-
ited.”).  Even the Fifth Amendment is phrased in terms of a restraint upon a power that is 
nowhere explicitly granted to the federal government.  See ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 73–77 (1987) (discussing the adoption of the 
Fifth Amendment); William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of 
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985) (discussing the 
adoption and ratification of the Fifth Amendment). 
 10 Early proponents of the natural law theory, such as Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, Bynker-
shoek, and Montesquieu, discussed eminent domain in terms of an inherent power.  See 
generally 1 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 503 (“This power [of eminent domain] was originally in 
the people, in their sovereign capacity, and was by them delegated to the legislature in 
the general grant of legislative power.”); PAUL, supra note 9, at 74–77; Arthur Lenhoff, 
Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 596, 596–601 (1942); 
Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 559–600. 
 11 Nichols notes that the extent to which eminent domain was recognized and used under 
Roman law is unclear, but that any such power used by the Romans disappeared after the 
fall of the Roman Empire, and did not re-emerge until post-feudalism days. 1 NICHOLS 
2d, supra note 8, at 5.  Nichols noted: 
The origin of the power of eminent domain is lost in obscurity, since before the ti-
tle of the individual property owner as against the state was recognized and pro-
tected by law, the right to take land for public use was merged in the general pow-
er of the government over all persons and property within its jurisdiction. 
  Id. at 4. 
 12 Id. at 5. 
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modern notions of eminent domain,13 the transition did not occur 
overnight.  For example, even as private property rights evolved and 
gained heightened legal stature and protection, the English king re-
tained significant rights under common law to take private land for 
constructing structures for defense against the public enemy or the 
sea (such as lighthouses) without compensation, or to take provisions 
for the royal household with compensation.14 
Modern notions of eminent domain seemed to have developed 
from an English procedure known as “inquest of office,” which al-
lowed the taking of private property for purposes such as the con-
struction of new roads through the issuance of a writ of ad quod dam-
num and a proceeding in which a jury determined damages.15  
However, this proceeding was ex parte and the property owner had 
no right to be notified of the proceeding, to object to the location of 
the new road, or to challenge the amount of damages awarded.16  
Thus, the sovereign was not required to answer to the courts in any 
way in terms of the “necessity” of the taking. 
The American colonies adopted the notion of eminent domain 
from English law, and initially used the power of eminent domain 
primarily for the establishment of roads.17  Because land in colonial 
America was, for the most part, undeveloped and plentiful and, in 
fact, often had not even been assigned to private ownership,18 the ap-
plication of eminent domain in the American colonies was rather in-
formal.  Compensation, particularly where the land was unimproved, 
was often not required by law as such land was viewed as having little, 
if any, value.19  Nonetheless, the English system of ad quod damnum 
had a clear influence upon early colonial practices, and juries were 
often used to determine the course of roads and the damages due to 
land owners whose property was taken.20  However, as in England, this 
procedure was apparently more administrative than judicial in na-
 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 5–6. 
 15 Id. at 6–7. 
 16 Id. at 8. 
 17 Id. at 13–14; see also Stoebuck, supra note 6, at 563–66.  Other early uses of eminent do-
main were uses that had a clear public use or public purpose, such as to foster improve-
ments such as the development of mills or the drainage of land.  See Philip Nichols, Jr., 
The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615, 617 (1940) 
(“Only a few situations existed, in the primitive America of that day, where eminent do-
main was felt to be needed.  These included rights of way for roads and flowage ease-
ments for mills.”). 
 18 1 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 14. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 14–15. 
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ture, and proceedings were often ex parte, affording the landowner 
no right of notification or opportunity to be heard.21 
There are hints in colonial law of “necessity” playing a limited role 
in these early exercises of the eminent domain power.  For example, 
when lands were initially granted in colonial Pennsylvania, it was with 
the understanding that six percent of the land was reserved for high-
ways; as a result, the sovereign did not need to exercise eminent do-
main to construct such roads.  Nonetheless, a 1700 Pennsylvania co-
lonial law provided “that no such road shall be carried through any 
man’s improved lands, but where there is a necessity for same” and 
required the empanelment of a six-man jury to determine the value 
of the improvements so taken and the compensation due the owner.22 
However, in these early takings, the judiciary, to the extent it was 
involved at all, was concerned primarily with the issues of damages 
and adequate compensation; the question of the necessity of the tak-
ing itself got short, if any, shrift from the courts.  Rather, the courts 
viewed the issue of necessity as one to be decided by the legislature or 
its delegates, not by the courts.  Christopher Teideman, in his influ-
ential late nineteenth century treatise on the police power, summa-
rized the status of early eminent domain law as follows: 
Except so far as the exercise of the power may be limited and controlled 
by provisions of the constitution, the necessity for its exercise is left to the 
legislative discretion.  The courts cannot question the necessity for the 
taking, provided the land is taken for a public purpose.  The legislative 
determination of the necessity is final, and is not subject to review by the 
courts.23 
B. The Historical Role of the Judiciary in Determinations of Necessity 
Modern necessity doctrine has been shaped largely by historical 
notions of the proper relationship between the legislature and the 
judiciary.  Philip Nichols, the author of a leading turn-of-the-
twentieth-century treatise on eminent domain law, extensively dis-
cussed the balance between judicial and legislative power, stating:  
“The exercise by a court of the power to nullify the wishes of the rep-
resentatives of the people, enacted into law in solemn form, is indeed 
full of grave responsibility and not to be called into play indiscrimi-
 
 21 2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 900. 
 22 Act of 1700, quoted in Feree v. Meily, 3 Yeates 153, 1801 WL 743, at *2 (Pa. 1801); see also 1 
NICHOLS, 2d, supra note 8, at 19 (discussing the statute in Feree and other such laws). 
 23 CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE POLICE POWER IN 
THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT 372–73 
(The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2001) (1886). 
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nately.”24  Nichols further stated that there were three canons by 
which the court’s power to overturn a legislative decision was con-
strained in the early years of the republic.  The first of these dealt 
with the presumption of validity that was to be afforded legislative de-
cision making: 
Every presumption should be made in favor of the validity of a statute.  It 
is not to be held a violation of the fundamental charter established by the 
people in their constitution unless so clearly outside the power conferred 
upon the legislature as to be free from reasonable doubt in that regard.  
It must be assumed that the legislature intended to act within its lawful 
bounds, and this assumption cannot be overthrown unless the statute 
unmistakably oversteps these bounds by manifest and plain terms.25 
Nichols thus described a sharp philosophical difference in how 
the courts defined their role vis-à-vis the legislature:  “[T]he courts 
have nothing to do with the wisdom or expediency of a statute, 
and . . . questions of public or governmental policy are not judicial.”26 
However, Nichols also ruefully noted that over time, as the power 
of the judiciary to set aside legislative acts became more recognized, 
“it became a common thing for courts to declare statutes to be un-
constitutional upon strained and technical reasoning, whenever they 
seemed to the courts to be unfair or even merely unwise.”27  Nichols, 
by contrast, embraced the notion of judicial deference to legislative 
decision making, stating: 
When a court is asked to pass upon the constitutionality of an act of the 
legislature, a co-ordinate branch of the government, the court should not 
decide whether in its own opinion the act is constitutional or not, but 
whether the members of the legislature, as reasonable men, might have 
fairly considered it constitutional.  Every presumption is in favor of the 
validity of the law, and it is only when it seems clearly a violation of the 
constitution “at first blush” that the court will hold it invalid.28 
Nichols viewed public use challenges to takings in these terms as 
well, stating that “the question, as it presents itself to the courts, is not 
whether the use for which the property is taken is public, but whether 
the legislature might reasonably consider it public.”29  However, Ni-
chols also recognized an outer limit on the deference due the legisla-
ture by the judiciary, concluding that: 
 
 24 1 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 34. 
 25 Id. at 35.  The other two canons dealt with constitutional limitations on the legislature 
(which were to be measured in general terms of liberty and justice), and in the interpre-
tation of the Constitution by an independent judiciary.  Id. 
 26 Id. at 37. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 88. 
 29 Id. at 154. 
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[I]f the court, after giving due weight.to [sic] the declaration of the legis-
lature, considers that the purpose for which the taking of property has 
been authorized has no real and substantial relation to the public use, it 
is its duty to declare the act authorizing the taking to be unconstitu-
tional.30 
In practice, however, the erosion of judicial deference to legisla-
tive decision making that Nichols lamented did not seem to extend to 
determinations of necessity, which remained largely within the realm 
of the legislature.31  While the court might, in rare instances, deter-
mine that there was no necessity present such that the taking was inva-
lid, if any necessity was present, no matter how slight, the court gen-
erally viewed the exercise of the eminent domain power as a 
legislative question beyond its purview.32  Moreover, this deference 
was not diminished just because the legislature might have chosen to 
delegate all or part of its condemning authority to a specific agency 
or entity (such as a public or private corporation) as state legislatures 
were (and still are) empowered to do.33  As stated by the U.S. Su-
preme Court:  “[T]he necessity and expediency of the taking of 
property for public use ‘are legislative questions, no matter who may 
 
 30 Id. at 155. 
 31 See 1A NICHOLS 3d, supra note 6, § 4.11[1] (describing necessity determination as a legis-
lative power). As Nichols remarks: 
When the legislature has made its decision and has authorized the taking of land 
by eminent domain, the owner has no constitutional right to have this decision re-
viewed in judicial proceedings or to be heard by a court on the question whether 
the public improvement for which it is taken is required by public necessity and 
convenience, or whether it is necessary or expedient that his land be taken for 
such improvement, unless the public use alleged for the taking is a mere pretense. 
Id.   See also Adirondack Ry. Co. v. New York, 176 U.S. 335, 349 (1900) (“The general rule is 
that the necessity or expediency of appropriating particular property for public use is not 
a matter of judicial cognizance but one for the determination of the legislative branch of 
the government . . . .”). 
 32 2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 910–11 (“In every case therefore it is a judicial question 
whether the taking is of such a nature that it is or may be founded on a public necessity.  
But while the courts have frequently declared their power to set aside acts of the legisla-
ture upon such a ground, cases in which the power has been actually exercised seem rare-
ly to have arisen.” (footnote omitted)). 
 33 See id. at 920 (“The legislature may, and usually does, delegate the power of selecting the 
land to be condemned to the public agent that is to do the work.”); see also Boom Co. v. 
Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878) (“The property may be appropriated by an act of the 
legislature, or the power of appropriating it may be delegated to private corporations, to 
be exercised by them in the execution of works in which the public is interested.”); Peo-
ple ex rel. Herrick v. Smith, 21 N.Y. 595, 598 (N.Y. 1860) (stating that the eminent domain 
power “may be exercised by means of a statute which shall at once designate the property 
to be appropriated and the purpose of the appropriation; or it may be delegated to pub-
lic officers, or, as it has been repeatedly held, to private corporations established to carry 
on enterprises in which the public are interested”). 
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be charged with their decision.’”34  Thus, the non-legislative recipient 
of the eminent domain power was typically afforded much the same 
judicial deference with regard to the necessity of the taking as was the 
legislature, provided the recipient acted “reasonably and in good 
faith” in making the necessity determination.35 
Nichols and the author of another early treatise on eminent do-
main, John Lewis, both discussed extensively the meaning of “neces-
sity” and the role of the courts in evaluating this issue in early takings 
cases.  Both asserted that the element of necessity raises three ques-
tions:  (1) whether a particular public improvement should be con-
structed; (2) where such an improvement should be located; and (3) 
whether the eminent domain power should be employed to acquire 
the property needed for the improvement.36  However, Nichols and 
Lewis placed all of these questions squarely within the exclusive do-
main and jurisdiction of the legislature, as did early courts.37  Nichols 
explained the basis for this rule in historical terms, stating: 
 
 34 N. Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 284 (1925) (citations omitted). 
 35 2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 920; see TIEDEMAN, supra note 23, at 376 (collecting cases 
and noting it is “constitutionally unobjectionable to delegate to the corporation or indi-
vidual, along with the exercise of the right of eminent domain, the power to determine 
finally upon the necessity for the taking, without any judicial investigation”). 
   However, Nichols stated where the legislature had delegated the eminent domain 
authority to a non-legislative body, such as a public agency or private corporation, the 
courts were less reluctant to evaluate the necessity of the underlying taking than they 
would have been if the legislature had made the determination itself.  See 2 NICHOLS 2d, 
supra note 8, at 921 (“[T]he courts may hold [determinations of necessity made by dele-
gated parties] to be unlawful without the reluctance they feel in declaring acts of the leg-
islature unconstitutional.”).  While the courts would not interfere where some necessity 
was present, a complete lack of necessity for the taking was a judicial question to which a 
positive answer would render the taking unauthorized and would warrant judicial inter-
vention.  Id. 
 36 See 2 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 1053; 2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 908. 
 37 For Nichols, see 2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 908 (“When the legislature has made its 
decision and has authorized the taking of land by eminent domain, the owner has no 
constitutional right to have this decision reviewed in judicial proceedings or to be heard 
by a court on the question whether the public improvement for which it is taken is re-
quired by public necessity and convenience, or whether it is necessary and expedient that 
his land be taken for such improvement, unless the public use alleged for the taking is 
mere pretense.”).  For Lewis, see 1 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 503 (“The necessity, expedi-
ency or propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain, and the extent and man-
ner of its exercise, are questions of general public policy and belong to the legislative de-
partment of the government.”).  See also id. at 674 (“Whether the power of eminent 
domain shall be put in motion for any particular public purpose, and whether the exi-
gencies of the occasion and the public welfare require or justify its exercise, are questions 
which rest entirely with the legislature.”).  For the early court decisions, see Richland 
School Twp. v. Overmeyer, 73 N.E. 811, 813 (Ind. 1905) (“The authority to determine in any 
case whether it is necessary or expedient to permit the exercise of the power of eminent 
domain, when not prohibited by the Constitution, rests with the legislative department of 
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[T]he courts have no power to revise any enactment of the legislature 
unless it violates some clause of the constitution. The constitutions of the 
great majority of the states contain no provision prohibiting the taking of 
land for public use except for necessary or economically expedient un-
dertakings, or unless the work can be done in no other way, nor was it 
the practice when the state constitutions were adopted to require a judi-
cial hearing upon the question of necessity in eminent domain cases, so 
that it can be plausibly argued that such a hearing is essential to due 
process of law.38 
Lewis and Nichols made clear their understandings that the answer to 
the first question—whether a particular public improvement should 
be constructed—in particular lay solely within the legislature’s deci-
sion-making authority.39  This result, Nichols found, followed directly 
from the independent power of the legislature to make determina-
tions of the need for specific public improvements.  As Nichols suc-
cinctly put it: 
If the legislature should determine that it was unwise to establish a public 
improvement for which there was a considerable demand, no one would 
suppose that such a determination could be reviewed by the courts, and 
the principle is the same if the determination of the legislature is the 
other way.40 
The second question—whether a particular piece of property is 
needed for the improvement—was also a matter left solely to the leg-
islature.41  The theme of judicial deference to legislative determina-
 
the state; and the propriety of taking private property for public use is not a judicial ques-
tion, but one of political sovereignty, and a hearing upon the facts as to such propriety or 
necessity is not required.”), overruled in part by Cemetery Co. v. Warren Sch. Tp., 139 
N.E.2d 538 (Ind. 1957); In re Niagara Falls & Whirlpool Ry. Co., 15 N.E. 429, 431 (N.Y. 
1888) (“[T]he necessity or expediency of taking private property for [public] uses by the 
exercise of the power of eminent domain, the instrumentalities to be used and the extent 
to which such right shall be delegated are questions appertaining to the political and leg-
islative branches of the government . . . .”). 
 38 2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 909. 
 39 See id. at 908 (noting “as there is no fixed principle which decides what public improve-
ments shall be undertaken and where they shall be located, these questions must be set-
tled by some department of the government”; that body, Nichols concluded, is the legisla-
ture); see also 1 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 678 (“The courts cannot inquire into the motives 
which actuate the authorities or enter into the propriety of making the particular im-
provements.”); 2 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 1056 (“The necessity of making any proposed 
work or improvement is also a [sic] purely a legislative question, unless otherwise pro-
vided by the constitution or statute.”). 
 40 2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 908–09. 
 41 See 2 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 1068 (“[T]hose invested with the power of eminent domain 
for a public purpose, can make their own location according to their own views of what is 
best or expedient, and this discretion cannot be controlled by the courts.”); 2 NICHOLS 
2d, supra note 8, at 899 (“[T]he laying out or establishment of a specific public improve-
ment and consequently the determination that a certain definite tract of private land 
shall be taken by eminent domain for such improvement is a purely legislative act, and 
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tions of location was established early on, led in part by pragmatic 
considerations.  A landowner could not argue that the taking of his 
land was not “necessary” because a neighbor’s land was just as (or 
perhaps more) suitable for the legislature’s purpose.42  The condem-
nor often had to choose between two equally useful or similarly-
situated parcels of property.  Neither could be considered “uniquely 
necessary” because of the existence of the other as a suitable option, 
yet nonetheless one or the other had to be chosen if the project was 
to go forward. 
By the early twentieth century, this notion of judicial deference to 
legislative determinations regarding siting was firmly entrenched in 
both the courts’ opinions and in the scholarly commentary.  For ex-
ample, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in 1900:  “The general rule is 
that the necessity or expediency of appropriating particular property 
for public use is not a matter of judicial cognizance but one for the 
determination of the legislative branch of the government.”43  Simi-
larly, Nichols noted:  “When it is decided to take land by eminent 
domain, what land shall be taken and how much, are matters in the 
discretion of the legislature,” although he qualified that statement by 
adding that “land that manifestly cannot be used cannot be taken.”44  
Thus, when there was no necessity to justify the taking, Nichols found 
that the taking would be unlawful, but where the land could be put to 
some use for the public good at stake, the “degree of necessity” was 
not a judicial matter.45 
This qualification (that “land that manifestly cannot be used can-
not be taken”) merges into Nichols’s and Lewis’s third question—
whether the eminent domain power should be exercised to acquire 
the property needed for the improvement—which is similarly re-
 
can be effected without the intervention of the courts at any stage of the proceed-
ings . . . .”). 
 42 See Kansas & Tex. Coal Ry. Co. v. N.W. Coal & Mining Co., 61 S.W. 684, 690 (Mo. 1901) 
(noting that if the rule were otherwise, “the plaintiff could not condemn any land; for 
every other landowner would likewise have the same right to object to his land being 
condemned”). 
 43 Adirondack Ry. Co. v. New York, 176 U.S. 335, 349 (1900). The Court went on to state:  
“The State possesses the [takings] power as a sovereign and as a sovereign exerts it.  How 
can its citizens call on the courts to review the grounds on which the State has acted in 
the absence of legislation permitting that to be done?”  Id.; see also Boom Co. v. Patterson, 
98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878) (“When the use is public, the necessity or expediency of appro-
priating any particular property is not a subject of judicial cognizance.”). 
 44 2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 918–19.  As Nichols explained, “The owner of the land 
which it has been decided to take is not entitled to be heard upon the question whether 
an equally available site was not already in possession of the public, or could be bought 
elsewhere for less than the fair value of his land.”  Id. at 917. 
 45 Id. at 921. 
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solved by the separation of powers between the judiciary and legisla-
ture, and in state constitutional provisions.  According to Lewis, in 
the absence of a state constitutional provision to the contrary, “[t]he 
question of exercising the power of eminent domain for any particu-
lar public use is solely for the legislature.”46  And as Nichols ex-
plained, “[t]he constitutions of the great majority of the states con-
tain no provision prohibiting the taking of land for public use except 
for necessary or economically expedient undertakings.”47 
However, Nichols noted “a theoretical limit beyond which the leg-
islature cannot go.”48  Takings ostensibly made in furtherance of a 
public improvement which the condemnation “can never by any pos-
sibility serve” or takings for uses that are not public would deprive the 
landowner of property without due process, and so would call for ju-
dicial intervention.49  In short, Nichols concluded, the judiciary could 
intervene only where the legislature “had acted with total lack of 
judgment or in bad faith.”50  Although this rule would seem to leave 
the landowner with little protection from ill-conceived acts of the leg-
islature, Lewis dismissed such concerns, stating: 
The owner is assumed to be sufficiently protected from an abuse of the 
power by the fact that the condemnor is not likely to take and pay for 
property which it does not need and which it cannot sell and cannot law-
fully use for any other purpose than that for which it was con-
demned . . . .51 
Despite the overwhelmingly strong notion that determinations of 
necessity were legislative questions, the judiciary nonetheless retained 
a role in necessity determinations.  The judiciary typically intervened 
in one of two instances.  The first involved abuses of discretion; the 
second was where a statute specifically granted the court a role in 
these decision-making processes. 
Nichols addressed the first instance—abuses of discretion—in his 
treatise.  His analysis was based on the fundamental notion that a per-
 
 46 2 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 1056.  The exception is where the state constitution does provide 
for judicial review of the necessity for the taking.  Lewis, for example, describes in detail a 
decision by the Supreme Court of Vermont, which, faced with a state constitution provid-
ing that private property can be taken for public use only when it is necessary for such 
use, ruled that necessity was thus a judicial question.  See id. at 1053–55 (discussing Stearns 
v. Barre, 50 A. 1086 (Vt. 1901)). 
 47 2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 909. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id.; see also id. at 910 (stating that the Due Process Clause “would protect an individual 
who was deprived of his property under pretense of eminent domain in ostensible behalf 
of a public enterprise for which it could not be used”). 
 50 Id. 
 51 2 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 1055. 
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son whose property is taken by eminent domain is protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that an arbitrary, unfair, or un-
just taking is not allowed, even if the taking is for the public use and 
the property owner is compensated.52 
The second instance where the judiciary could make evaluations 
of necessity involved situations in which a specific law gave the court 
the power to do so.  For example, Michigan passed a constitutional 
provision in 1851 that made the determination of necessity a decision 
for a jury or commissioners appointed by a court.  This body consid-
ered both the necessity of the improvement and the necessity of tak-
ing the land at issue for the improvement.53  In discussing legislative 
delegations of necessity determinations to the judiciary, Nichols ex-
plained: 
Such a duty [determining the necessity of a proposed taking], although 
primarily legislative, is not so essentially unjudicial that to impose it upon 
a court is a violation of the principle of the separation of powers, and in 
several states it has been enacted with respect to particular classes of pub-
lic improvements that land shall not be taken unless the taking is found 
to be necessary by the court.54 
This suggests that traditional judicial deference to the legislature’s 
determinations of necessity was premised on respect for legislative so-
vereignty and for the distinct roles of the judiciary and legislature, as 
opposed to any inherent limitation on judicial power.  In general, 
however, the courts traditionally have taken a hands-off approach to 
issues of necessity.  As summarized by the Illinois Supreme Court in a 
1951 case: 
[W]here the right to condemn exists, and the property is subject to the 
right of eminent domain and is being condemned for a public use, and 
the right to condemn is not being abused, courts cannot deny the right 
to condemn on the ground that the exercise of the power is unnecessary 
or not expedient, as the determination of that question devolves upon 
the legislative branch of the government and is a question which the ju-
dicial branch of the government cannot determine.55 
The court went on to define the role of the judiciary narrowly: 
[C]ourts may only rightfully determine whether a petitioner has the 
power to exercise the right of eminent domain, whether the property is 
subject to the right of eminent domain and is being taken for a public 
use, whether the power is being abused, as by the taking of an excessive 
amount of property, and other kindred questions which do not involve a 
 
 52 See 2 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 897–98 (noting the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
arbitrary takings). 
 53 See id. at 922 (discussing the Michigan constitutional provision). 
 54 Id. at 923. 
 55 City of Chicago v. Vaccarro, 97 N.E.2d 766, 771 (Ill. 1951). 
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determination of the necessity or expediency of the taking of the lands 
sought to be condemned.56 
In short, questions of the necessity of taking have historically fallen to 
the legislature, not the judiciary, to decide.  Even today, the courts 
profess to have little role in reviewing these legislative actions, in the 
absence of legislative bad faith and abuse of discretion.57 
C.  The Overlap Between Necessity and Public Use 
There is a significant overlap between “necessity” and “public 
use,” and this overlap has colored the way in which the courts have 
historically analyzed these issues.  “Public use” is a term fraught with 
controversy and subject to considerable interpretative nuances under 
modern law.58  Historically, the state courts, in particular, have di-
verged on how they treat the term.  Courts adopting the narrower 
view of the concept of “public use” require that the condemned 
property be employed only for projects where the public can actually 
directly use the property acquired (e.g., for a road, school, park, or 
other public good).59  By contrast, courts adopting the broad view 
treat “public use” as coterminous with “public advantage” or “public 
benefit.”60  Under this view, “public use” is broadly defined as “‘con-
ducive to community prosperity,’”61 which would include “[a]ny exer-
cise of eminent domain which tends to enlarge resources, increase 
 
 56 Id. 
 57 See City of Phoenix v. McCullough, 536 P.2d 230, 235 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (“[A] con-
demnor’s determination of necessity should not be disturbed on judicial review in the ab-
sence of fraud or arbitrary and capricious conduct.”); City of Atlanta v. Heirs of Cham-
pion, 261 S.E.2d 343, 344 (Ga. 1979) (“The question of whether there is a necessity for 
taking the fee is a matter of legislative discretion, which will not be interfered with or con-
trolled unless the authority acts in bad faith or beyond the powers conferred upon it by 
law.”); Westrick v. Approval of Bond of Peoples Natural Gas Co., 520 A.2d 963, 965 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1987) (“Administrative decisions of a condemnor concerning the amount, 
location, or type of estate condemned are not subject to judicial review unless such deci-
sions are in bad faith, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of power.”); HTK Mgmt., L.L.C. v. 
Seattle Popular Monorail Auth. (In re Seattle Monorail Popular Auth.), 121 P.3d 1166, 
1175 (Wash. 2005) (“A declaration of necessity by a proper municipal authority is conclu-
sive in the absence of actual fraud or arbitrary and capricious conduct, as would consti-
tute constructive fraud.”). 
 58 See generally 2A NICHOLS 3d, supra note 6, §§ 7.01[1], 7.02[3] (discussing meaning of 
“public use”); Lynda J. Oswald, Public Uses and Non-Uses:  Sinister Schemes, Improper Motives, 
and Bad Faith in Eminent Domain Law, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 45, 52–57 (2008) (dis-
cussing the same). 
 59 See 2A NICHOLS 3d, supra note 6, § 7.02[2] (discussing the narrow view of public use). 
 60 See id. § 7.01[2]. 
 61 Id. § 7.02[4] (quoting People of Puerto Rico v. E. Sugar Assoc., 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 
1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 772 (1946)). 
114 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:1 
 
industrial energies, or promote the productive power of any consid-
erable number of inhabitants of a state or community.”62 
The U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its historical adoption63 of the 
broad view of public use in Kelo v. City of New London.  Justice Stevens, 
writing for the majority, stated that “this ‘Court long ago rejected any 
literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the 
general public.’”64  Instead, the Kelo majority turned to what it 
deemed the “broader and more natural interpretation of public use 
as ‘public purpose.’”65  The Court also emphasized the “great respect” 
that the federal courts should pay the state courts and legislatures in 
identifying local public needs,66 stating that:  “When the legislature’s 
purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational, our cases make 
clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings—no less than 
debates over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legisla-
tion—are not to be carried out in the federal courts.”67  Rather, “if a 
legislature . . . determines there are substantial reasons for an exer-
 
 62 Id. § 7.02[3]. 
 63 See Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (pointing out 
the “inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test” for public use); Fallbrook 
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 161–62 (1896) (finding that “public use” means 
furthering a public interest). 
 64 545 U.S. 469, 479 (2005) (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)). 
 65 Id. at 480.  The Kelo majority had a long line of precedent to look to, in which the Court 
had repeatedly held that the judicial role in the public use inquiry was extremely limited.  
See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“The role of the judiciary in determin-
ing whether that [eminent domain] power is being exercised for a public purpose is an 
extremely narrow one.”).  The Kelo Court in particular turned to Berman, where it had 
found that “[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive” enough to allow 
the use of eminent domain to achieve any legislatively permissible end, Kelo, 545 U.S. at 
481 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 33), and its 1984 decision in Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), where the Court stated that the eminent domain power is 
“coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers,” id. at 240, and that a taking 
must be upheld if it is “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.”  Id. at 241. 
 66 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482 (citing Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606–07 
(1908)). 
 67 Id. at 488 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242–43).  As explained in the leading treatise in 
the area of eminent domain law: 
When the legislature has authorized the exercise of eminent domain in a particu-
lar case, it has necessarily adjudicated that the land to be taken is needed for the 
public use, and no other or further adjudication is necessary.  When the legisla-
ture has made its decision and has authorized the taking of land by eminent do-
main, the owner has no constitutional right to have this decision reviewed in judi-
cial proceedings or to be heard by a court on the question whether the public 
improvement for which it is taken is required by public necessity and convenience, 
or whether it is necessary or expedient that his land be taken for such improve-
ment, unless the public use alleged for the taking is a mere pretense. 
  See 1A NICHOLS 3d, supra note 7, § 4.11[1]. 
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cise of the taking power, courts must defer to its determination that 
the taking will serve a public use.”68 
Treating “public use” as coterminous with “public purpose,” how-
ever, does little to resolve the question of what types of takings are 
permissible, as the term “public purpose” itself is subject to consider-
able variations in interpretation.69  Moreover, the high degree of def-
erence afforded by both state and federal courts to legislative deter-
minations to condemn property means that property owners can 
expect little relief from takings by falling back on arguments relating 
to public use. 
Theoretically, “public use” and “necessity” are completely distinct 
inquiries.70  Necessity usually arises in the context of determining 
whether the proposed project furthers a public purpose and thus is a 
public use.71  Whether “public use” is present is clearly a question for 
the judiciary,72 while determination of “necessity” (i.e., whether the 
proposed project furthers the stated public use) is for the legisla-
ture.73  As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Shoemaker v. United States: 
[W]hile the courts have power to determine whether the use for which 
private property is authorized by the legislature to be taken, is in fact a 
public use, yet, if this question is decided in the affirmative, the judicial 
function is exhausted; that the extent to which such property shall be 
taken for such use rests wholly in the legislative discretion, subject only to 
the restraint that just compensation must be made.74 
Thus, the courts may not “substitute their own judgment” for that of 
the legislature or reject a taking simply because the legislature could 
 
 68 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244. 
 69 In the words of an Illinois Appellate Court, “[w]hat constitutes a ‘public purpose’ . . . has 
plagued the American judiciary ever since it arrogated to itself the prerogative of inter-
preting constitutions.”  Lake Louise Improvement Ass’n v. Multimedia Cablevision, 510 
N.E.2d 982, 984 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
 70 1 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 502–03 (“Nearly all the cases, however, hold that the question of 
necessity is distinct from the question of public use, and that the former question is ex-
clusively for the legislature.”). 
 71 See City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 15 (Nev. 2003) (“In 
an eminent domain proceeding, necessity is usually raised in the context of challenging 
whether a project furthers a public purpose and therefore constitutes a public use.”). 
 72 1 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 499 (“[P]rivate property can be taken only for public use, 
and . . . what is a public use is a question for the courts.”). 
 73 Id. at 503 (“[T]he question of necessity is distinct from the question of public use, 
and . . . the former question is exclusively for the legislature”); see also TIEDEMAN, supra 
note 23, at 378 (“It is a legislative question whether the public exigencies require the ap-
propriation, but it is a clearly a judicial question, whether a particular confiscation of land 
has been made for a public purpose.”). 
 74 147 U.S. 282, 298 (1893); see also In re Niagara Falls & Whirlpool Ry. Co., 15 N.E. 429, 431 
(N.Y. 1888) (stating that when a use is public, the necessity of the taking is not a matter 
for the judiciary, but for the “political and legislative branches”). 
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have achieved the public purpose through a different mechanism or 
method.75 
In practice, however, the distinction between the “public use” and 
“necessity” was, and still is, murky.76  “Public use” historically was (and 
still is) often defined in terms of “necessity.”77  For example, the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court stated in 1911 that:  “The right to take pri-
vate property for a public use is founded upon and limited by public 
necessity.  Where the necessity stops there stops the right to take, 
both as to amount of land and the nature of the interest therein.”78  
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the California Supreme 
Court defined necessity in terms of public use, providing that emi-
nent domain is “the right of the sovereignty to use the property of its 
members for the public good or public necessity.”79  Similarly, Lewis 
stated that even though a state’s constitution and statutes might be 
silent on the issue of necessity, “the power to take is, in every case, li-
mited to such and so much property as is necessary for the public use 
in question.”80  Necessity, in this context, means only a reasonable, 
but not an absolute, necessity,81 and the requirement is deemed met 
 
 75 See City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency, 76 P.3d at 15. 
 76 See Thornton Dev. Auth. v. Upah, 640 F. Supp. 1071, 1076 (D. Colo. 1986) (“[T]he issues 
of necessity and public purpose are closely related and, to some extent, intercon-
nected.”). 
 77 For example, Nichols defines “public use” serving: 
(1) to enable the United States or a state or one of its subdivisions to carry on its 
governmental functions, and to preserve the safety, health and comfort of the pub-
lic, whether or not the individual members of the public may make use of the 
property so taken, provided the taking is made by a public body; [or] (2) to serve 
the public with some necessity or convenience of life which is required by the public as 
such and which cannot be readily furnished without the aid of some governmental 
power, whether or not the taking is made by a public body, provided the public 
may enjoy such service as of right. 
  1 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 140 (emphasis added). 
 78 In re Winnisimmet Co., 95 N.E. 293, 294 (Mass. 1911). 
 79 Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229, 250 (1861).  Moreover, the court went on to state:  
“The word necessity, in this connection, is not to be used in too limited a sense; it means a 
want, an exigency, an expediency, for the interest or safety of the State.”  Id.  It also dis-
cussed public use specifically, stating: 
If the use for which the property is taken be to satisfy a great public want or public 
exigency, it is a public use in the meaning of the Constitution, and the State is not 
limited to any given mode of applying that property to satisfy the want, or to meet 
the exigency. 
  Id. at 251.  Interestingly, the Massachusetts State Constitution also provides for compensa-
tion “whenever the public exigencies require that the property of any individual should 
be appropriated to public uses.”  MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X.  The Massachusetts Supreme 
Court has determined that “public exigenc[ies]” encompass “public convenience and ne-
cessity.”  Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 
360, 392 (1839). 
 80 2 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 1060. 
 81 Id. at 1062. 
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if “the property sought to be condemned would conduce to some ex-
tent to the accomplishment of the public object to which it was to be 
devoted.”82 
Thus, while necessity may be reserved for the legislature and pub-
lic use may be reserved for the judiciary, the two are inextricably 
connected.  While early courts and commentators agreed that neces-
sity is a critical element of eminent domain—that taking property 
unnecessarily is unconstitutional—they also clearly viewed the deter-
mination of necessity as being a legislative or political one.  And even 
though the early courts and commentators often distinguished be-
tween different necessity issues, the majority of authorities resolved 
the issues in the same manner—broad deference to legislative will.  
Thus, while early courts might have intervened to prevent a taking, 
they typically did do so on necessity grounds only where it was appar-
ent that the legislature had abused its power or acted in bad faith.83 
The Washington Supreme Court recently addressed this issue, in 
its decision in HTK Management, L.L.C. v. Seattle Popular Monorail Au-
thority (In re Seattle Popular Monorail Authority).84  The court noted that 
“even though the two terms do overlap to some extent,” there is a dif-
ference between stating that condemnation is for a “public use” and 
that it is a “public necessity.”85  Although the legislature’s declaration 
that the specific use of property is a public use “is entitled to great 
weight,” the declaration “is not dispositive,” as the question of public 
use fundamentally is “a judicial question.”86  A declaration of the ne-
cessity to condemn certain land, by contrast, is “conclusive” absent 
“actual fraud or arbitrary and capricious conduct” tantamount to 
constructive fraud.87 
In summary, although some states have statutory or constitutional 
provisions requiring a finding of necessity to support a taking,88 in 
 
 82 Id.; see also Vittetoe v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 123 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Iowa 1963) (stating that 
Lewis’ view of necessity is applicable to an eminent domain dispute). 
 83 2 LEWIS, supra note 7, at 1063. 
 84 121 P.3d 1166 (Wash. 2005). 
 85 Id. at 1175. 
 86 Id. (quoting WASH. CONST. art. I,  § 16). 
 87 Id. 
 88 The language of the North Dakota statute is typical of such provisions: 
Before property can be taken it must appear: 
1.  That the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law. 
2.  That the taking is necessary to such use. 
3.  If already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to which it is to 
be applied is a more necessary public use. 
  N.D. CENT. CODE § 32–15–05 (2008).  For similar statutes, see ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.270 
(2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12–1112 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7–704 (2008); 
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 70–30–111 (2008). 
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most states the requirement arises through judicial application of 
constitutional principles pertaining to eminent domain and due 
process.  Regardless of whether the requirement of necessity arises 
statutorily or through judicial doctrine, the courts are generally reluc-
tant to review necessity determinations, generally imposing a very 
narrow standard of review based on abuse of discretion, arbitrary and 
capricious decisionmaking, or bad faith.89  Moreover, the courts make 
clear that the standard is one of reasonable, not absolute, necessity.90 
Nonetheless, necessity review provides some hope for targets of an 
eminent domain action, especially if the proceeding is disputed in 
state court.  Although courts are deferential to the condemnor’s find-
ings regarding necessity, state courts do occasionally overturn takings 
on necessity grounds.  The next three Parts of this Article will exam-
ine these possibilities.  First, the court may view the municipal plan as 
too speculative or remote to be justified.  Second, the municipality 
may not have surmounted all procedural or regulatory requirements.  
Third, the land sought by the municipality may exceed what is neces-
sary to fulfill the stated public purpose.  The next Part examines the 
decisions in these three categories where landowners have success-
fully challenged taking efforts on necessity grounds.91 
II.  THE EMINENT DOMAIN PLAN IS TOO REMOTE OR SPECULATIVE 
Eminent domain doctrine has long cast a skeptical eye upon tak-
ings that appear speculative in nature.  Nichols asserted in his trea-
tise, for example, that “if [a] proposed taking savored at all of a mu-
nicipal law speculation, no court would hesitate to hold it 
 
 89 See Swenson v. County of Milwaukee, 63 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Wis. 1954) (“[C]ourts will not 
disturb . . . [a determination of necessity] in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or gross 
abuse of discretion.” (quoting 18 AM. JUR. Eminent Domain § 108)).  See also King v. City of 
McCaysville, 33 S.E.2d 99, 100 (Ga. 1945) (“In the absence of bad faith, the exercise of 
the right of eminent domain rests largely in the discretion of the authority exercising 
such right, as to the necessity, and what and how much land shall be taken.”); Seba v. In-
dep. Sch. Dist. No. 3, 253 P.2d 559, 561 (Okla. 1953) (“The ordinary rule in condemna-
tion cases is that while the particular property sought to be condemned must be necessary 
for the proposed project, the condemnor’s decision as to the necessity for taking particu-
lar property will not be disturbed in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discre-
tion.”). 
 90 See Falkner v. N. States Power Co., 248 N.W.2d 885, 894 (Wis. 1977) (“In determining ne-
cessity neither the legislature nor its delegate is limited to takings that are absolutely or 
indispensably necessary.  Necessary in this context has been construed to mean reasona-
bly necessary, reasonably requisite and proper for the accomplishment of the public pur-
pose for which the property is sought; necessary does not mean absolutely imperative.”). 
 91 For a categorization of necessity cases, see 71 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 97 (2008). 
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unconstitutional.”92  Challengers to takings (i.e., landowners) can 
thus weaken the strong presumption that necessity exists by showing 
that the future use is somehow uncertain, unplanned, or indetermi-
nate. 
A.  The Plan Is Uncertain 
The courts have long held that condemnors may take property 
not only for current public needs, but also for future needs that may 
be reasonably anticipated.93  A basic requirement of condemning for 
future uses is that the condemnor must at the very least have plans 
for using the land in the future.94  Those plans can be quite vague, 
provided the condemnor is acting in good faith.  In Port of Umatilla v. 
Richmond,95 for example, the Oregon Supreme Court found that a 
port authority could consider probable future needs, as well as known 
present needs, in determining the extent of land to be taken, pro-
vided its estimation of future needs was made in good faith.96 
The “good faith” requirement implies that the condemnor must 
have some reasonable basis for anticipating a need for the property 
 
 92 1 NICHOLS 2d, supra note 8, at 178. 
 93 See, e.g., Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (“In determining 
whether the taking of property is necessary for public use not only the present demands 
of the public, but those which may be fairly anticipated in the future, may be consid-
ered.”); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Parachini, 29 Cal. App. 3d 159, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1972) (stating that in determining whether condemnation is necessary for a public use, 
“the court is entitled to consider not only present needs, but those which can be fairly an-
ticipated on account of future growth”); City of Chicago v. Vaccarro, 97 N.E.2d 766, 772 
(Ill. 1951) (condemnor should consider “not only the present needs of the public, but 
those which may be fairly anticipated in the future”); White Mountain Power Co. v. Whi-
taker, 213 A.2d 800, 804 (N.H. 1965) (“[P]roperty may be taken for uses which may be 
reasonably anticipated in the future.”); Rueb v. Oklahoma City, 435 P.2d 139, 141 (Okla. 
1967) (“A future hope based on speculation is not sufficient to justify the taking of private 
property in a condemnation proceeding.  But a condemning authority may consider 
those demands which may be fairly anticipated in the future.”). 
 94 E.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d 472, 480–81 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1961) (taking of easements for phone lines with “no present intention to install 
any such lines” and uncertainty as to whether “the public [will ever] receive any benefit 
from the acquisition of the[] easements” lacks necessity and cannot be taken by eminent 
domain). 
 95 321 P.2d 338 (Or. 1958). 
 96 Id. at 350–51 (“A condemning corporation may condemn lands sufficient to provide for 
not only its present but also its prospective necessities, if it is not more than may in good 
faith be presumed necessary for future use within a reasonable time.” (internal quota-
tions and citation omitted)); see also City of Waukegan v. Stanczak, 129 N.E.2d 751, 756 
(Ill. 1955) (“As to amount, condemning authorities have substantial discretion to take 
land sufficient not only for present needs but future requirements . . . which they can and 
should anticipate. . . . Unless the discretion is abused or any area grossly excessive is tak-
en . . . the taking will not be disturbed.” (citations omitted)). 
120 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:1 
 
in the future.  Where such a basis is lacking, the taking is likely to fail.  
In Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. Huschke,97 for example, a utility 
company sought an easement over private property through eminent 
domain.98  The dominant reason put forth by the utility for the taking 
was that the utility needed to accommodate a second transmission 
line sometime in the future.99  The utility never specified when in the 
future the line might be constructed, nor did it specify a concrete 
plan that needed to be accommodated.100  The utility also failed to 
obtain necessary governmental approvals for a second transmission 
line that would have utilized the land at issue.101  The trial court 
found, without detailed discussion, that the taking for this easement 
was an abuse of the utility’s powers of eminent domain.102 
Similarly, in State v. 0.62033 Acres of Land in Christiana Hundred,103 
the Delaware State Highway Department sought to condemn land for 
a future four-lane highway.104  The Department admitted it had no 
present plans for a highway and could only anticipate that at “some 
time in the future” a highway might be required.105  The Department 
had not yet taken any official action in furtherance of construction of 
the highway and could not state with any certainty that plans for a 
highway would eventually be drafted.106  Indeed, the only reason the 
Department gave for the condemnation was that taking the land was 
a money-saving measure in what was apparently a rising real estate 
market.107  While the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that saving 
taxpayer dollars by buying land early was a “very commendable pur-
pose,” this reasoning, combined with the lack of any specifics regard-
ing time and plans, did not constitute sufficient necessity to take the 
land at issue.108 
 
 97 409 A.2d 153 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979). 
 98 Id. at 154. 
 99 Id. at 157.  The utility justified the taking by stating that it required access to install the 
power line, flexibility to determine power line location, and a need for a buffer zone.  Id. 
at 156–57.  The court concluded that these justifications did not apply to the defendant.  
Id. at 157. 
100 See id. (suggesting the plan was indeterminate). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 112 A.2d 857 (Del. 1955). 
104 See id. at 858, 860 (detailing the highway improvements that caused the Delaware State 
Highway Department to seek to acquire the defendants’ land). 
105 Id. at 860. 
106 See id. (“[T]he Department had taken no official action whatsoever for the construction 
of a four-lane highway.”). 
107 See id. (“[T]he Department acknowledged . . . that the taking of a 100 foot right-of-way at 
this time was largely in order to save money for the state . . . .”). 
108 Id. 
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Likewise, in Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Chicago & North 
Western Transportation Co.,109 the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld 
the lower court’s dismissal of an eminent domain petition on the 
grounds that the condemnor had failed to show “necessity.”110  The 
regents of the University had negotiated to purchase property from a 
railroad, but the negotiations failed and the railroad accepted an of-
fer from another purchaser instead.  The regents then sought to 
condemn the property.111  The University had no concrete plans for 
the property but had considered several types of potential but mutu-
ally exclusive uses.112 
The trial court was statutorily charged with the task of determin-
ing whether the taking “appear[ed] to be necessary.”113  “Necessity in 
this context” required a showing by the condemnor that the property 
was being taken for an identifiable public purpose for use “now or in 
the near future.”114  The appellate court found that the University was 
unlawfully attempting to “stockpil[e]” the land for speculative future 
use.115  Not only had the University not included the property on its 
master plan, but the Regents had not approved any project for the 
land and environmental contamination present on the property 
meant that a multi-year remediation process would be required be-
fore it could be used for any of the proposed purposes.116 
However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals restricted the scope of 
this ruling in subsequent cases, stating first that “necessity cannot be 
thwarted by alleging that . . . the purpose for condemning the prop-
erty is too speculative if in fact the project is officially supported by 
the governmental entity and ordinary agreements are in place to real-
ize the project,”117 and second, that “[t]he rule established in Re-
 
109 552 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). 
110 Id. at 578, 580. 
111 Id. at 580. 
112 See id. (“[A]lthough the University claims to have at least three potential uses for the land, 
the uses are mutually exclusive, and the Board of Regents has not yet approved a single 
project for the property.”). 
113 Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 117.075 (1994)). 
114 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State ex. rel. City of Duluth v. Duluth St. 
Ry., 229 N.W. 883, 884 (Minn. 1930)). 
115 See Regents, 552 N.W.2d at 580 (“The University may well have the right to purchase this 
property, but it cannot acquire it for speculative future use (stockpiling) by condemna-
tion.”). 
116 See id. (“[B]ecause of soil contamination problems . . . the University could not currently 
use the property for any of its proposed uses.  The parties have not yet agreed on a reme-
diation plan . . . [which will require] approximately two to seven years . . . .”). 
117 Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Opus N.W., L.L.C. (In re Condemnation by Minneapo-
lis Cmty. Dev. Agency), 582 N.W.2d 596, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
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gents . . . is limited by the extreme facts present in that controversy.”118  
The appellate court has also emphasized the deference accorded the 
trial court’s finding in necessity determinations.  In an unpublished 
2006 decision, Economic Development Authority v. Hmong-American Shop-
ping Center, L.L.C., for example, the court of appeals rejected the ar-
gument by a landowner that the taking of its land for blight-clearing 
purposes failed the necessity test simply because the condemnor ad-
mitted “that there was no definite use, plan, or design concept for the 
land beyond the acquisition, demolition, and remediation of the 
property to prepare it for redevelopment.”119  Rather, the appellate 
court found that the trial court had not clearly erred in finding that 
the condemnor’s determination of necessity was not manifestly arbi-
trary or unreasonable.120  Unlike the nebulous actions by the con-
demnor in Regents, the condemnor in Hmong-American Shopping Center 
had included the disputed parcel within its plans and had adopted 
resolutions finding it was in the public interest and necessary for the 
condemnor to acquire the property, through negotiation or con-
demnation, in order to eliminate blight, increase the tax base, and 
bolster the public health and welfare.121  The condemnor had pro-
vided both a plan and a timeline (of less than one year) for clearing 
the property and remediating any environmental problems.122  More-
over, both the condemnor and the condemnee agreed that redevel-
opment could not occur unless the condemnor acquired the con-
demnee’s parcel.123  The court found that the only similarity between 
the instant case and Regents was the “lack of a finalized and specific 
use for the land after the removal of blight and environmental con-
tamination,” but also held that “Regents does not require that a final 
design concept be in place” prior to the taking.124 
 
118 Itasca County v. Carpenter, 602 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
119 No. A05–1239, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 438, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. May 9, 2006). 
120 See id. at *13 (“Here, we must give deference to the district court’s findings and ultimate 
conclusion that the [Economic Development Authority (“EDA”)] sufficiently demon-
strated necessity.”). 
121 See id. at *4–5 (discussing the EDA board’s resolutions). 
122 See id. at *14 (“[T]he EDA had both a plan and timeline—of less than a year—for razing 
the buildings and remediation of the environmental damage . . . .”). 
123 See id. at *13 (“[T]he board of commissioners of the EDA had adopted a resolution find-
ing that it was in the public interest and was necessary for the EDA to proceed with the 
proposed redevelopment and to acquire the property through negotiation or by eminent 
domain . . . .”). 
124 Id. at *14. 
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B.  The Timing of the Plan’s Execution Is Too Vague 
Condemnation actions can also fail for lack of necessity where the 
timing of the proposed public use is uncertain or so far in the future 
as to make the use itself speculative.  While condemnors may find it 
fiscally advantageous to condemn early and to accumulate land for 
anticipated future uses,125 courts have struck down such plans on ne-
cessity grounds.  For example, in Board of Education v. Baczewski, the 
Michigan Supreme Court struck down a school board’s attempt to 
take property for a high school site that would not be needed for thir-
ty years or more.126  The school board made clear that its actions were 
motivated by economic planning and a desire to save future taxpayers 
money by acquiring the land far in advance of anticipated need, 
while the land was still undeveloped and hence less valuable.127  The 
court held that the state constitution’s requirement that there be 
“necessity for using such property”128 meant that the condemnor had 
to show that the property would be either used immediately or within 
“the near future” or a “reasonably immediate” time.129 
Similarly, the California Appellate Court found that while the 
condemnor was permitted to condemn an easement for electric lines, 
its efforts to take gas and telephone line easements across the same 
land failed for lack of necessity because the condemnor had made no 
showing that it contemplated future installation of such lines; rather, 
it was only trying “to cover the possibility of a need” for an easement 
 
125 As explained in Donald M. Zupanec, Eminent Domain:  Validity of Appropriation of Property 
for Anticipated Future Use, 80 A.L.R. 3D 1085 (1977): 
The motives behind the desire for present condemnation of property to be used 
in the future are both obvious and understandable.  The rule that any taking of 
private property for a public use requires the payment of just compensation, cou-
pled with the fact that the value of real property follows an ever-increasing spiral, 
makes it manifestly more economical for a condemnor to acquire property at pre-
sent, when its value is less, than to delay condemnation until the point in the fu-
ture when immediate use is planned, by which time the value of the property in-
evitably will have risen, as will the amount of compensation which will have to be 
paid.  Moreover, land-use planning may be made more effective and less disruptive 
where future needs can be anticipated and property acquired ahead of time to 
provide therefor. 
  Id. § 2(a) (footnote omitted). 
126 65 N.W.2d 810, 811 (Mich. 1954). 
127 See id. (“Appellee instituted this proceeding long before there was need for a new high 
school site, in order to save money.”). 
128 MICH. CONST. of 1908, art. 13, § 2 (“When private property is taken for the use or benefit 
of the public, the necessity for using such property . . . shall be ascertained by a 
jury . . . .”).  This language does not appear in the current Michigan State Constitution. 
129 Baczewski, 65 N.W.2d at 813 (internal quotations omitted). 
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for such purposes at some unspecified time in the future.130  Likewise, 
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held that a taking of farm-
land to satisfy a projected need for new school buildings within the 
next five-to-twelve years was an abuse of discretion, albeit made in 
good faith, because the “probable need” for the land was based on 
“assumptions and possibilities that [had] been challenged by contrary 
evidence.”131  While the court acknowledged that a school district 
needs to engage in long-term planning for future needs and that 
purchase of land to meet those needs was “proper and commend-
able,” the court found that condemnation of land to support such 
needs would require “more” support than mere “projections based 
on possible housing development.”132  Yet, it is unclear what that 
something “more” would be, as the court also acknowledged that the 
projections used to calculate future needs were “based on the best 
available information” and that the school board relied upon those 
figures in good faith in calculating its future needs.133  Presumably, it 
was the five-to twelve-year time horizon that gave the court pause. 
Certainly, condemnors can take property somewhat in advance of 
the anticipated public use.  For example, the California Appellate 
Court upheld a condemnation for a school to be built within four 
years of the taking134 and the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the tak-
ing of land for utility purposes where the land was needed to satisfy 
present and future demands for power reasonably anticipated within 
the next five years.135  Likewise, the Arkansas Supreme Court permit-
ted the taking of extra land to enable a planned two-lane highway to 
be expanded into a four-lane divided highway at an unspecified time 
in the future when funds permitted its construction.136  The court’s 
holding may have been influenced by the fact that traffic counts al-
ready justified the wider road, and it apparently was only a lack of 
funding that resulted in the narrower road being first built. 
Similarly, the Kentucky Appellate Court saw no lack of necessity or 
excess condemnation when a municipality condemned land for 
 
130 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d 472, 480 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1961). 
131 In re Condemnation by Octorara Area Sch. Dist., 556 A.2d 527, 527, 531 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1989). 
132 Id. at 531. 
133 Id. 
134 Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist. v. Vieira, 241 Cal. App. 2d 169, 172–73 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1966). 
135 Shelor v. W. Power & Gas Co., 449 P.2d 591, 593 (Kan. 1969). 
136 Woollard v. State Highway Comm’n, 249 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Ark. 1952). 
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planned construction of a reservoir thirty years hence.137  The court 
noted that customary planning practice was to project water needs 
thirty years out,138 and noted that “a municipality may also procure 
land in contemplation of such reasonable necessity as may arise in 
the future.”139  The Florida Appellate Court went even further, up-
holding a condemnation for park purposes, even though the exact 
nature of the park was not known at the time of condemnation, and 
even though it was uncertain where the park would be constructed 
(although it was acknowledged that the city had no immediate inten-
tion of pursuing the park use).140 
The difficulty lies in determining just how far in the future the 
public purpose may lie without running afoul of necessity determina-
tions.  This issue was addressed in City of Phoenix v. McCullough.141  The 
Phoenix city council passed an ordinance authorizing city officials to 
acquire two parcels of land by eminent domain to expand a local air-
port.142  In August 1969, the city commenced an action to condemn 
five lots owned by the McCulloughs.143  According to the airport mas-
ter development plan, twenty percent of the McCulloughs’ property 
would be used between 1984 and 1992 and the remaining eighty per-
cent would be used by 2015.144  According to the city, these specific 
 
137 See McGee v. City of Williamstown, 308 S.W.2d 795 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957). 
138 See id. at 797 (“The thirty-year [water use] projection into the future is . . . a customary 
procedure in planning water reservoirs.”). 
139 Id. at 796. 
140 See City of St. Petersburg v. Vinoy Park Hotel Co., 352 So. 2d 149, 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1977) (“[I]t is not necessary that a condemnor, representing the state or a political subdi-
vision of the state, have funds on hand, plans and specifications prepared and all other 
preperations necessary for immediate construction before it can determine the necessity 
for taking property for a public use.  In point of fact, it is the duty of public officials to 
look to the future and plan for the future . . . .” (quoting Cent. & S. Fla. Flood Control 
Dist. v. Wye River Farms, Inc., 297 So. 2d 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)) (emphasis omit-
ted)). 
141 536 P.2d 230 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975). 
142 See id. at 231 (“On August 12, 1969, the City Council of the City of Phoenix passed Ordi-
nance No. S-4878 authorizing various city officials to acquire title to two parcels of land 
‘for the purpose of expanding, improving and developing Sky Harbor Municipal Air-
port.’”). 
143 See id. (“Pursuant to this ordinance, the City on August 28, 1969 instituted this action 
seeking to condemn the lots owned by the McCulloughs.”). 
144 See id. at 232 (“According to this Master Plan, approximately 20% of the McCullough 
property would be used between 1984 and 1992 and the remaining 80% would be used in 
the year 2015.”). 
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parcels were being taken to permit the expansion of air freight facili-
ties and ancillary services, as well as to provide off-street parking.145 
An Arizona state statute provided:  “[b]efore property may be tak-
en, it shall appear that . . . [t]he taking is necessary to such use.”146  
The appellate court noted that the phrase “necessary to such use” 
unavoidably introduces a time element into the evaluations of the va-
lidity of the taking.147  Although the court acknowledged that a con-
demnor could “legitimately consider future needs in determining 
what property and the amount of property is necessary for use,”148 the 
court also questioned “how far in the future . . . the condemnor 
[may] crystal gaze before the taking loses the essence of necessity.”149  
The court appeared to view the consideration of necessity through 
the lens of a balancing test.150  On the one hand, a city has legitimate 
fiscal interests in taking as much land as possible as early as possible 
in a rising land market.151  Takings for future uses also enable system-
atic long-term planning for public use.152  On the other hand, land-
owners have a strong interest in retaining possession of their land, 
not only to reap the benefits of rising land values but also to reap the 
benefits of ownership of real property.153  Moreover, private owner-
ship benefits the city because it keeps land available for public taxa-
 
145 See id. (“[T]he McCullough Properties ‘were required at the time this said action was filed 
to provide for the expansion of the airfreight [sic] facilities and to provide ancillary ser-
vices necessary thereof.’”). 
146 Id. at 235 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 12–1112 (1956)). 
147 Id. at 234. 
148 Id. at 235. 
149 Id. at 236.  The court rejected the city’s initial argument that a legislative determination 
of necessity per se removes the decision from judicial scrutiny, although the court also 
stated that “a condemnor’s determination of necessity should not be disturbed on judicial 
review in the absence of fraud or arbitrary and capricious conduct.”  Id. at 235. 
150 See id. at 236 (stating that necessity review “requires a balancing of competing interests”). 
151 See id. (“Obviously, a condemnor considering future needs is interested in the legitimate 
pursuit of saving taxpayers’ money . . . .”). 
152 See id. (“[A] systematic planning for future public use should be encouraged.”). 
153 See id. (“Equally as obvious is the interest of the private landowner in holding and using 
his property as long as possible, not only to take advantage of rising real estate values, but 
also to enjoy the advantages that land ownership affords.”); see also Zupanec, supra note 
125, § 2(a): 
As the condemnor gains economically by present acquisition, so does the land-
owner lose.  If condemnation occurs at any point in time substantially prior to the 
point at which the property is actually used, the owner will have received less in 
compensation than would have been the case had condemnation been delayed 
and the property permitted to appreciate.  Additionally, the owner generally has 
an interest, whether tangible or intangible, in retaining possession of his property 
for as long as possible.  Whether the property is used for residential or business 
purposes, its owner normally is reluctant, for personal or economic reasons, to 
part with it before absolutely necessary. 
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tion as long as possible.154  The challenge, from the McCullough 
Court’s perspective, was to “keep within bounds government planners 
whose schemes require an ever-increasing diet of private land to sat-
isfy their planning appetites [while] encourag[ing] systematic plan-
ning of acquisition of land for public use.”155 
Interestingly, after articulating this balancing inquiry, the court 
then interpreted the necessity requirement as a simple reasonable-
ness test, stating that a condemning authority can acquire additional 
property for future use as long as the proposed public use will occur 
within “a reasonably foreseeable future.”156  A reasonable time, the 
court stated, would be determined by the “surrounding circum-
stances.”157  Here, the city’s proposed use for the property would not 
occur until fifteen to forty-six years in the future.158  Moreover, the city 
attorney admitted to the trial court that the city knew the plan was go-
ing to change over time and there was no way to know today how the 
lots would actually be used in 2015.159  The appellate court concluded 
that where the condemnor does not know when or how a future use 
of condemned property will occur, the future use is “unreasonable, 
speculative and remote as a matter of law.”160 
The court hinted that it might have accepted a fifteen-year or 
even longer future timetable as reasonable.161  However, the decades-
long delay in property use, combined with the possibility that even 
the fifteen-year use might change, compelled the court to override 
the city’s decision to condemn.  The court seemed to reach this out-
come reluctantly, remarking that it had “no other choice” but to 
reach this conclusion.162  Thus, although the McCullough court recog-
nized in general terms that municipalities may condemn property for 
future use, it found that the condemnation at issue was for a purpose 
so remote and speculative, it could not be upheld. 
 
154 See McCullough, 536 P.2d at 236 (“[T]here is something to be said for keeping private real 
property on the tax rolls as long as that property is not needed for public use.”). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. (quoting City of Phoenix v. Donofrio, 407 P.2d 91, 95 (Ariz. 1965)). 
157 Id. 
158 See id. (questioning the reasonableness of a time fifteen to forty-six years in the future). 
159 See id. (“[T]here is question of whether the City will even use the property in 1984 or 
2015.”). 
160 Id. at 237; see also id. (“[E]ven this 15-year use might change . . . .”). 
161 See id. (stating that in the absence of uncertainty as to future use, the court “might hesi-
tate to hold that 15 years in the future was not a reasonable time for future planning”). 
162 Id. at 236.  The court cited the attorney’s trial court remarks and the reference to the 
city’s master plan as a “‘general concept and guide.’”  Id. at 236.  The court cited no other 
evidence beyond the length of time to support its no-necessity determination.  Id. at 236–
37. 
128 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:1 
 
Other courts have found a lack of necessity with even shorter time 
horizons than those found in McCullough.  In Meyer v. Northern Indiana 
Public Service Co.,163 for example, a utility sought to take two rights-of-
way by eminent domain—one for a 345 kilovolt (kV) power line and 
one for a 138 kV power line.164  While the utility offered specific evi-
dence about the need for the 345 kV line, it lacked the same evidence 
for the 138 kV line.165  An engineer testified that the 138 kV line was 
to service an “anticipated load” in the future, but the utility had no 
documentation regarding the planning of the 138 kV line and no 
specific plans for its development.166  The engineer could not state 
whether the 138 kV line would be constructed more than six years 
from the date of the trial court hearing.  Furthermore, one of the 
landowners testified that he was told that at least ten years would pass 
before the 138 kV line would be constructed.167  The Court reasoned 
that the need for the 138 kV line was purely speculative and ruled in 
favor of the landowner on the grounds of lack of necessity. 
Meyer appears similar to McCullough—in both, the court struck 
down the condemnation as lacking necessity, except that the Meyer 
court seemed to be less tolerant of a delay much shorter than that 
found in McCullough.  The explanation may lie in the degree of plan-
ning engaged in by the two condemnors.  In McCullough, the city had 
a specific, written plan for future use of the condemned property, al-
beit with very long time horizons.  In Meyer, by contrast, the utility 
had no such written plan and could not even hazard a guess as to 
when the land would be used.  This suggests that an additional factor 
that can influence how a court views a condemnation for future use is 
the degree of planning engaged in by the condemnor.  The less de-
fined the time horizon for use, and the less defined the plan, the 
more likely it may be that the condemnee can successfully challenge 
the taking for future use on necessity grounds. 
In Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, for example, the Utah Supreme 
Court struck down a proposed taking for park and recreation pur-
 
163 258 N.E.2d 57 (Ind. 1970). 
164 See id. at 58 (“[T]he present plans and need call for a 345 KV transmission line 
and . . . the appellee would need 150 feet right-of-way width for the construction and 
maintenance of such a line.”). 
165 See id. (“[T]here were no memoranda concerning the planning of the 138 KV line . . . .”). 
166 Id.  The engineer testified, “we really haven’t started planning.  This is ahead of any plan-
ning that I would get into.  Planning of the line has not actually begun except that we 
have an anticipated load that’s the reason that we are doing what we are.”  Id. (internal 
quotations omitted). 
167 See id. (“Mr. Etzler had represented to the property owners that it would be ten years or 
more before the 138 KV line would be constructed . . . .”). 
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poses on the basis of lack of necessity.168  In support of its holding, the 
Supreme Court noted that: 
[N]o defined plan[] ha[s] been adopted or approved, . . . no time frame 
of use within the reasonably foreseeable future ha[s] been deter-
mined, . . . a voluntary acquisition of nearby property for public use some 
six years prior ha[s] not as yet been placed to its intended purpose, 
and . . . no funds ha[ve] been requested, budgeted, appropriated or were 
presently in existence to place the property in question to use.169 
These cases suggest that unless the condemnor’s future plans are 
outrageously distant in the future, challengers to takings (i.e., land-
owners) must weaken the strong necessity presumption by showing 
that the future taking is somehow uncertain, unplanned, or indeter-
minate.170  Ultimately, the indeterminacy and time issues might be 
evaluated together in a kind of linked continuum.  The more distant 
the proffered time of the use of the property, the less indeterminacy 
might be required to destroy any necessity presumption. 
C.  Other Considerations Prevent a Justification of Necessity 
Although courts have rejected municipal actions without any plan 
to develop the property as lacking necessity, even when a municipal-
ity presents specific plans and goals to justify a taking, it may not sur-
vive a judicial review of necessity.  In Hodges v. Jacksonville Transporta-
tion Authority,171 for example, the Florida court of appeals found that a 
municipal transit authority had failed to make its requisite showing 
that its condemnation of the petitioner’s land was reasonably neces-
sary where at least four, and possibly five, other routes were available 
to it, and where the city already owned a substantial portion of the 
right of way for the road were it to be built in the original proposed 
alignment.172 
In City of Helena v. DeWolf, municipal planners sought to redevelop 
a blighted commercial area.173  The plan sought to consolidate land 
 
168 567 P.2d 182, 184 (Utah 1977). 
169 Id. 
170 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 552 N.W.2d 578, 580  
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that although condemning for future use is permissible, 
the university’s taking failed for lack of necessity because it had not included the con-
demned property in its master plan; had articulated three mutually exclusive uses for the 
property, none of which had been approved by the Board of Regents; and soil contamina-
tion would prevent use of the unremediated land for any of the three purposes, yet no 
remediation plan had been devised). 
171 353 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). 
172 Id. at 1215. 
173 508 P.2d 122, 124 (Mont. 1973). 
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ownership, demolish unsuitable structures, and install public im-
provements, such as sewers, curbs, and accessible streets in order to 
attract private development.174  Some buildings were kept in spite of 
their poor state because of their historical significance.175  Other 
buildings were rehabilitated or destroyed altogether.176  City planners 
picked and chose which tracts to take in a broad area.177  Planners se-
lected the defendant’s property for taking, although the court found 
the defendant’s property was not substandard or blighted, despite be-
ing in a blighted area.178 
The defendants claimed that the city lacked necessity to take their 
property, a 9000 square foot tract with a supermarket and commer-
cial stores.179  The property was located on the extreme edge of the 
urban renewal project.180  Further, although defendants admitted to 
the necessity of urban renewal, they challenged the necessity of the 
particular use associated with their property, an outer parking area 
for more centralized businesses in the urban redevelopment area.181 
At trial, planners introduced, according to the court, “consider-
able evidence” about the plan and the specific uses of defendants’ 
property, including traffic and parking requirements.182  In spite of 
these efforts, the court determined that the city failed to present suf-
ficient proof of necessity.183 
The court’s reasoning is instructive.  First, the court took into ac-
count the geographic location of the parcel within the entire project, 
stating that because the “[d]efendants’ property stands at the ex-
treme edge of the project[, i]t can be eliminated from the project 
 
174 See id. (“[The Urban Renewal Agency] consolidat[es] land ownership, install[s] public 
improvements such as streets, sewers and curbs, and demolish[es] existing structures on 
an area basis.”). 
175 See id. (“Some dilapidated properties were being kept for historical purposes.”). 
176 See id. (“Some properties were shown as to rehabilitation projects.”). 
177 See id. (“The properties taken are on a selective basis . . . .”). 
178 See id. (“Defendants’ property was inspected and found to be lacking in meeting what 
were called ‘code standards’ in some respects; but the record is clear, and the trial court 
found, that the necessary improvements could and would [have been] made except for 
this litigation.”). 
179 Id. at 123–24. 
180 Id. at 128. 
181 See id. at 126 (noting that defendant’s brief described the plan to be “a ‘planner’s dream 
expressed in architectural drawings’”).  The plan consisted of a ‘shopping center’ model 
whereby the commercial zone would be surrounded by streets and parking, thereby sepa-
rating vehicle and pedestrian traffic.  Id. at 124. 
182 Id. at 127. 
183 See id. (“[W]e do not find sufficient credible testimony to uphold the district court’s find-
ings.”). 
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without harming the balance of the project.”184  The court cited testi-
mony by city officials admitting that the renewal plan could be 
amended to eliminate the defendants’ land for the project without 
interfering with parking or traffic flows.185 
The court thus appears to distinguish between core and periph-
eral properties.  Properties at the geographical edge might demand a 
greater showing of necessity from city planners.  Perhaps this reason-
ing was implicit in the McCullogh Court’s decision to dismiss a taking 
of property for the airport.  Recall that the land at issue was not for a 
central terminal or airstrip, but for the expansion of freight facilities 
and ancillary services.  The difference between core and peripheral 
might not just be a geographical distinction, it might also apply to the 
plan itself.  If the core purpose of the plan is to build a highway, for 
example, ancillary needs such as commuter parking lots and rest 
stops might receive more judicial scrutiny under a necessity chal-
lenge. 
More fundamentally, the DeWolf court reviewed the necessity de-
termination by examining the “particular property” at issue and not 
simply the entire project.186  This reasoning creates particular advan-
tages for the landowner because it weakens or severs the necessity re-
view from the overall context of the overall plan, neighborhood, or 
goals.  For example, many states have statutes promoting condemna-
tion in blighted areas.187  Interpreted most broadly, if a necessity re-
view demands a focus on the particular property, does that mean that 
taking a non-blighted property should be examined absent from the 
blighted area surrounding it?  If so, then takings of broad urban areas 
for redevelopment might be particularly difficult because an individ-
ual non-blighted property could thwart the development of a large 
scale public project such as a highway, stadium, or shopping center.  
The court recognized the widely-held rule that taking broad areas is 
 
184 Id. at 128. 
185 See id. (using testimony from engineers to show that the project “would not alter the ef-
fectiveness of the street in serving the area”). 
186 Id. at 129 (quoting State Highway Comm’n v. Crossen-Nissen Co., 400 P.2d 283, 284 
(Mont. 1965)).  In State Highway Commission v. Crossen-Nissen Co., the court stated: 
The requirement that the condemnor must show necessity for the property taken 
does not mean that it must be indispensable to the proposed project.  Rather the 
word ‘necessary’ as used in section 93–9905 means that the particular property 
taken be reasonably requisite and proper for the accomplishment of the purpose 
for which it is sought under the peculiar circumstances of each case. 
  400 P.2d at 284. 
187 While some statutes define blight broadly, others, especially those passed after Kelo was 
decided, are quite restrictive.  See Amanda W. Goodin, Note, Rejecting the Return to Blight in 
Post-Kelo State Legislation, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 195–99 (2007) (discussing legislation that 
prohibits the use of eminent domain for development). 
132 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:1 
 
necessary to clear blighted areas and prevent their return, but also 
stated that if the specific property is not necessary for the blighted 
area’s clearance, then the “area concept” does not apply.188 
This pinpoint-style review is not universally accepted.  For exam-
ple, in City of Jacksonville v. Griffin, the Florida Supreme Court ruled 
that the District Court of Appeals had misinterpreted precedent in 
denying a city’s condemnation of land for redevelopment purposes.189  
The Court of Appeals had relied upon Ball v. City of Tallahassee, which 
held that “[t]he city must present evidence pinpointing the need for 
the particular property . . . sought to be condemned.”190  The Court of 
Appeals found that the taking failed because of the lack of “some 
specific plan for development of the property in the reasonably fore-
seeable future, including plans for financing such a vast undertak-
ing.”191  The Florida Supreme Court, however, noted that the primary 
principle articulated in Ball is that a condemnor must show some 
“reasonable necessity” for its taking; once it has done so, the con-
demnee “must then either concede the existence of a necessity or be 
prepared to show bad faith or abuse of discretion as an affirmative 
defense.”192  The Florida Supreme Court thus found that Ball “placed 
an unreasonable gloss” on earlier Florida eminent domain decisions 
insofar as it required pinpointing the need for the particular property 
at issue.193  The court reasoned that otherwise each landowner would 
be able to argue, “Why not my neighbor?” and thus harm the pros-
pects for eminent domain projects.194 
 
188 DeWolf, 508 P.2d at 127–28. 
189 346 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 1977) [hereinafter Griffin II]. 
190 281 So. 2d 333, 337 (Fla. 1973). 
191 Griffin v. City of Jacksonville, 314 So. 2d 605, 607 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) [hereinafter, 
Griffin I]. 
192 Griffin II, 346 So. 2d at 990. 
193 Id. at 991. 
194 See id. (“Were the City not permitted to exercise its discretion in good faith as to the se-
quence of the parcels to be condemned, then each landowner would be able to raise the 
question, ‘Why not my neighbor?’ and thereby effectively frustrate commencement or 
continuation of the project.  Such is not and cannot be the law.”); see also City of Holly-
wood Cmty. Redev. Agency v. 1843, LLC, 980 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) 
(“The condemning authority need not present evidence pinpointing the need for the 
particular property sought to be condemned.”).  By analogy, courts have ruled that a non-
blighted property in a blighted area may be subject to eminent domain as the condition 
of the total area determines its blight status and not individual parcels of land.  See gener-
ally Jonathan M. Purver, What Constitutes “Blighted Area” Within Urban Renewal and Redevel-
opment Statutes, 45 A.L.R. 3D 1096, § 2(b) (1972) (noting that courts are generally con-
cerned with the blighted status of an entire area rather than that of individual 
properties). 
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Returning to DeWolf, the final point worth mentioning is the 
grounds upon which the DeWolf Court reached its no-necessity de-
termination.  Even though the city proffered considerable evidence 
on its plans and goals, the court found no present necessity because 
the commercial businesses upon which the demand for parking 
would be based had not been established.195  The structures for the 
planned business had not yet been built.  No assurances were given 
that private enterprise would take root.  Even with robust private en-
terprise present, the city could not ensure that the defendants’ land 
was necessary for parking.  The court viewed the city’s motivation in 
taking the property as simply “to await money, motivation, and hopes 
of the planners.”196  The Court defined necessity as “a reasonable 
need with foreseeable ability to complete.”197  The city was required to 
show necessity, according to the Court, for both the amount of park-
ing needed and the probability that the buildings that required the 
parking would also be constructed.198  Failing that, the Court stated, 
takings would only be limited by “the architect’s imagination.”199 
In essence, DeWolf instructs that city planners cannot “bootstrap” 
necessity by taking some land for public use and then using that tak-
ing as proof of necessity for additional condemnations.  Florida and 
Montana are in agreement.  In the similar case of Baycol, Inc. v. Down-
town Development Authority,200 the city sought to take land for a shop-
ping mall, and argued that the businesses there would create the ne-
cessity of parking and further takings.201  The Court refused to permit 
the taking, reasoning that the city was placing “the cart before the 
horse” by attempting to create necessity by taking other property and 
applying it to a private interest.202  As Baycol affirmed, allowing such a 
taking for this reason would create a “dangerous precedent” and al-
low municipalities to circumvent necessity or public use inquiries for 
any property considered ancillary to the main redevelopment plan.203 
 
195 See City of Helena v. DeWolf, 508 P.2d 122, 128 (Mont. 1973) (“It is clear . . . that need for 
the parking . . . is not a present need nor a need in the reasonably foreseeable fu-
ture. . . . Thus, the concept of necessity for a public use is a possible future necessity.”). 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 129–30. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 129. 
200 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975). 
201 See id. at 458 (“It was also shown . . . that the creation of the shopping mall was to create 
the need for the public parking proposed.”). 
202 Id. at 457–58. 
203 Id. at 458. 
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The lesson from these cases is that the failure to cite any specific 
time frames whatsoever for use of the land will place the necessity of 
the taking in doubt.  Furthermore, taking land for the sole purpose 
of purchasing early in a rising real estate market will not constitute 
sufficient necessity to take a private owner’s land.  In addition, the 
failure to obtain specific approvals will also weigh against necessity.  It 
is questionable whether any municipality today, especially in light of 
the Kelo-fueled backlash against eminent domain, would condemn 
land with so little planning of its intended future use. 
III. PROCEDURAL OR REGULATORY HURDLES EXIST TO SUCCESSFUL 
DEVELOPMENT 
As a general matter, statutory grants of condemnation power are 
strictly construed, and condemnation actions in violation of the statu-
tory grant are invalid.204  The most obvious bureaucratic requirement 
that municipalities fail to follow, thereby showing lack of necessity, is 
their own written development plan.  In State v. Pacific Shore Land Co., 
the State of Oregon sought land for the development of a highway 
“right of way,” as stated by a resolution of the Highway Commission.205  
The court ruled that a portion of the land sought by the State fell 
outside the specific right of way specified in the State’s plan and was 
thus not necessary for development; as a result, the court blocked the 
State’s efforts to take the land.206 
In Monarch Chemical Works, Inc. v. City of Omaha, the City of Oma-
ha, Nebraska devised a “Master Plan” designed to redevelop a large 
area of blighted East Omaha for commercial and industrial sites.207  
The plaintiff owned vacant land in the area, and planned to use the 
land for development of storage tanks to store production materials, 
 
204 See, e.g., Village of Skokie v. Gianoulis, 632 N.E.2d 106, 111–12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“It is 
well established in Illinois that laws conferring the authority to take private property by 
exercising the power of eminent domain must be strictly construed . . . . A statutory grant 
of eminent domain power can only be exercised in the manner authorized by statute.” 
(citations omitted)); see also McCabe Petroleum Corp. v. Easment & Right-of-Way Across 
Twp. 12 N., 87 P.3d 479, 481 (Mont. 2004) (“[F]undamental real property rights require 
that ‘public uses’ for which the power of eminent domain are granted must be inter-
preted pursuant to the plain language set forth by the Legislature and cannot be im-
plied.”). 
205 269 P.2d 512, 520 (Or. 1954) (discussing the Oregon Highway Commission’s resolution). 
206 See id. (“Plaintiff ha[s] no authority under its resolution . . . to proceed by condemnation 
action . . . .”). 
207 277 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Neb. 1979). 
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such as asphalt.208  The plaintiff stated that although it was not cur-
rently using the land, the vacant land was so important to its opera-
tions that “if we don’t have [the vacant land], we have to . . . move the 
remaining plant to another location.”209 
After the plan’s approval, the city “selected plaintiff’s property as 
the site for . . . [a prison] complex . . . [desired by] the State of Ne-
braska.”210  The city amended the plan to specifically target the plain-
tiff’s property, but did not amend the plan’s stated purpose to in-
clude a penal complex nor did it amend the provision of the plan 
stating that property owned by existing industries for future expan-
sion purposes would not be purchased.211 
The plaintiff challenged the condemnation of its land.212  The Ne-
braska Supreme Court held that the taking of blighted or substan-
dard property for redevelopment and resale in accordance with an 
approved redevelopment plan as provided for by the state develop-
ment statute was a proper public use.213  However, here the city had 
failed to carry out its redevelopment plan in accordance with its own 
plan document.214  The court concluded that the plaintiff’s land was 
taken not to further the redevelopment purposes of the plan, but to 
simply accommodate the State’s need for a site for a penal com-
plex.215  Because the condemnation of the plaintiff’s land was not a 
part of the redevelopment plan, the taking was not for a public pur-
pose, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s is-
suance of an injunction.216 
 
208 See id. (“Presently there are plans to build two . . . storage tanks on the particular [vacant] 
property to take care of off-season purchase of construction-type asphalt.”). 
209 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 426–27. 
212 The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s public use and constitutional chal-
lenges to the taking, finding commercial development a public use and concluding that 
economic redevelopment is a sufficiently different purpose than development of manu-
facturing and industrial sites by eminent domain, which is prohibited by the Nebraska 
Constitution.  Id. at 427. 
213 See id. at 428 (“The taking of substandard or blighted areas by a city for redevelopment 
and resale in accordance with an approved redevelopment plan which is in conformity 
with a general plan for the municipality as a whole . . . is a proper public use for a mu-
nicipality.”). 
214 See id. (“The authority to acquire plaintiff’s land [here] was not provided for in the rede-
velopment plan in order to carry out the purposes of the plan . . . .”). 
215 See id. (noting the land was acquired “solely as an accommodation to the state to acquire a 
site for a penal complex which had nothing to do with the redevelopment plan”). 
216 See id. (“[T]he trial court was correct in issuing an injunction against the proceedings, 
and its judgment is affirmed.”). 
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The court’s ruling literally rested on public use grounds, but in-
terpreted through a different lens, this could have easily been a ne-
cessity case.  Instead of stating that acquisition for redevelopment and 
penal purposes were a necessary purpose of the plan, the plan simply 
created its own procedural hurdle by limiting its scope to develop-
ment and blight removal and by specifically disavowing any intent to 
condemn property held by existing industry for expansion purposes.  
Had the plan not contained the latter limitation, city planners might 
have been able to simply declare the penal complex a necessity, 
which under Nebraska law is a legislative question,217 and might have 
been able to take the land with minimal, if any, judicial scrutiny.  This 
case instructs that city planners can trigger no-necessity findings by 
taking actions that do not conform to the goals of the written plan, 
and a challenging landowner should thus scour the plan for such in-
consistencies. 
A municipal agency may also lose at the condemnation proceed-
ing when it fails to adhere to its own statutory limitations of authority.  
In Wilmington Parking Authority v. Land With Improvements, the Wil-
mington Parking Authority (“WPA”) was authorized by statute to take 
certain land by eminent domain for public parking purposes.218  The 
WPA orchestrated a plan for condemnation of property that would 
result in a significant percentage of the parking spaces being reserved 
for a local newspaper company, which would also receive the right to 
purchase land not available to the general public.219  The court found 
that sufficient evidence existed that the primary purpose of taking 
the land at issue was to retain the newspaper company as a corporate 
citizen, rather than to provide the public with parking facilities,220 and 
that the “paramount benefit” from the taking would go to the new-
paper company, not the public.221  As a result, the Delaware Supreme 
Court upheld the trial court’s refusal to grant the WPA’s immediate 
possession of the private property sought.222 
 
217 See id. at 427 (suggesting that, under Nebraska law, the defendants clearly had the power 
to declare the penal complex a necessity). 
218 521 A.2d 227, 228–29 (Del. 1986). 
219 See id. at 233–34 (“The court also noted that approximately ten percent of the 950 new 
spaces would be reserved for News-Journal employees.  In light of this evidence, the trial 
judge estimated that the net benefit to the public would be less than 350 spaces.”). 
220 See id. at 234 (“There is sufficient evidence to support the ultimate finding that the pri-
mary purpose of the project was to retain the News-Journal as a corporate citizen rather 
than to provide the public with parking facilities.”). 
221 Id. at 230–31. 
222 See id. at 234 (“Therefore, the WPA’s attempted exercise of its limited power of eminent 
domain was beyond its statutory authority[] . . . [and] the ruling of the Superior Court 
[i]s affirmed.”). 
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Although Wilmington discusses the taking in terms of public use 
and purpose, the case fundamentally rests upon a determination of 
necessity.  The dispositive issue in the case was not whether taking 
land and transferring it to a private entity was a proper public use.  
Delaware law at the time had well settled the notion that a public use 
that has a substantial benefit to private interests suffices for a proper 
taking.223  Rather, the case addressed whether the WPA’s taking of the 
defendant’s land was necessary for the purposes authorized for the 
WPA to pursue by statute.224  Again, the city might have avoided this 
legal wrangling if it had just sought eminent domain through another 
agency with broader statutory authority.  In cases such as these, where 
the public use prong is interpreted so broadly, often the most viable 
opportunity a landowner can hope for is that the municipality bun-
gles its effort to take through poor decision making or its own inter-
nal mismanagement. 
A municipality may also suffer a no-necessity finding when the tri-
al court to which it presents its condemnation question fails to grant 
the landowner even the most basic procedural rights.  For example, 
in Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. B. Willis, C.P.A, Inc., the plaintiff 
commenced a condemnation proceeding against the defendant to 
acquire an easement for the purpose of building a railroad spur.225  
Pursuant to an Oklahoma statute, the commissioners filed a report 
with the court, which the landowner-defendant challenged.226  The 
defendant argued that the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie 
case of necessity.227  When the defendant sought discovery to obtain 
evidence for trial, the trial court rejected the defendant’s motion and 
concluded that the defendant had neither a right to pursue discovery 
nor to contest the taking of his land.228  According to the trial court, 
the government agency merely needed to allege necessity in its peti-
tion.229  The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff,230 
 
223 See id. at 231 (“This Court has addressed on at least two occasions the question of whether 
a taking which results in a substantial benefit to private interests may nevertheless be for 
‘public use’ as required by the State and Federal constitutions.” (citing Wilmington Park-
ing v. Ranken, 105 A.2d 614 (Del. 1954), and Randolph v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 139 
A.2d 476 (Del. 1958))). 
224 Wilmington Parking Auth., 521 A.2d at 228–29. 
225 941 P.2d 995, 997 (Okla. 1997). 
226 See id. at 998 (“[Public Services Company (“PSO”)] has put on no proof whatsoever in 
support of its petition and none will be required at the hearing on remand before the tri-
al court, as the Court of Civil Appeals has placed the burden of proof on him rather than 
the condemning authority where it should be, all in violation of [Oklahoma law].”). 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 997–98. 
229 Id. 
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and—as the court of civil appeals subsequently did—rejected the 
landowner’s allegation that the absence of a resolution of necessity by 
the condemnor meant that the condemnor lacked a prima facie 
case.231 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed, however, holding that 
the condemnor must meet its initial burden of proof in a condemna-
tion case by making a prima facie case of necessity by introducing in-
to evidence a resolution of necessity, at which point the burden of 
proof shifts to the condemnor to show the taking is not necessary.232  
The court remarked that the plaintiff never attempted to submit its 
necessity resolution as evidence to the trial court, but merely attached 
the resolution to its supplemental brief.233  Because this fact pre-
cluded the defendant from challenging the resolution’s introduction 
into evidence and forced objections to it to be raised for the first time 
on appeal, the court concluded that the defendant had a right to a 
hearing on “all aspects of plaintiff’s condemnation” and to challenge 
the report that articulates the necessity of the government agency to 
take land by eminent domain.234  The court thus remanded the case 
back to the trial court for further proceedings based on the trial 
court’s improper denial of the defendant’s right to challenge the 
plaintiff’s “asserted but unproven right” to take the property.235 
It is difficult to say where the mishap lay in the plaintiff’s efforts to 
take.  The trial court’s highly deferential stance towards necessity was 
apparently not utterly unreasonable as it was affirmed by the inter-
mediate appellate court.236  The intermediate appellate court con-
cluded that filing a necessity resolution was not necessary but the 
mere act of filing a petition that alleges necessity creates a rebuttable 
presumption of the necessity of the taking.237  Perhaps the most useful 
lesson from Willis is that landowners should expect, at a minimum, an 
opportunity to be heard at trial, and that courts may not let a mu-
 
230 Id. at 998–99. 
231 See id. at 998 (“The Court of Civil Appeals agreed with the trial court that PSO was not 
required to file a copy of a resolution of necessity with its petition . . . and held that a res-
olution declaring the necessity of the taking was unnecessary . . . .”). 
232 Id. 
233 See id. at 999 (“PSO never attempted to have its resolution admitted into evidence by the 
trial court.  It simply attached the resolution to a supplemental brief.  Willis, therefore, 
had no opportunity to challenge its authenticity . . . or present any other objections to the 
trial court regarding the purported resolution.”). 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 1000.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court also held the defendant was improperly de-
nied the right to conduct discovery.  Id. 
236 Id. at 998. 
237 Id. 
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nicipality completely bypass the judicial system based upon its own 
determination of necessity.  The fact that such a basic right had to be 
litigated to a state’s supreme court, however, is an unnerving hint of 
how deferential courts can be in eminent domain cases. 
Resolution of environmental contamination issues was a leading 
cause of a no-necessity finding in Regents of the University of Minnesota 
v. Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., where the University of 
Minnesota sought to take by eminent domain a neighboring rail yard 
owned by the defendant for the purpose of placing potentially several 
types of facilities on the land.238  As noted earlier, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals concluded that the University’s proposed condem-
nation was not necessary in part because the University had no spe-
cific plan for the land and a University official testified the time be-
fore the property would be used was potentially indefinite.239  Calling 
the University’s efforts “stockpiling,” the court found for the land-
owner on grounds already examined in this article—the plan was too 
speculative and the timeline for development simply too long to 
prove necessity.240 
The court cited additional issues, however, that help further illu-
minate the necessity inquiry.  In addition to never receiving permis-
sion from its Board of Regents, the University sought to take land that 
was currently unusable because it was contaminated with oil during 
the years that the then-current landowner used the property as a rail-
road facility.241  In addition, the University had not yet reached an 
agreement on a remediation plan with the landowner even after sig-
nificant negotiations.242  Furthermore, even if a remediation agree-
ment were reached, it would have taken two to seven years beyond 
that to decontaminate the land.243  The lesson from Regents is that the 
presence of bureaucratic or other hurdles will be relevant for deter-
mining the necessity of a taking. 
The University’s dilatory conduct before the attempted taking 
probably did not help its case.  For years, the University apparently 
knew that the property owner wanted to sell but took little concrete 
 
238 552 N.W.2d 578, 579 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). 
239 See id. at 580 (“[T]he trial court did not clearly err in finding that the University had 
failed to demonstrate the required level of necessity for condemnation.”). 
240 Id.; see also supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
241 See Regents, 552 N.W.2d at 579 (“The Regents have not yet approved a single project for 
the property, allegedly due in part to the uncertainty arising out of the parties’ disagree-
ment over how to address the environmental contamination problems on the property.”). 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
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action to purchase the land.244  Other than obtaining two appraisals, 
the University did not act.245  Only after the railroad received an offer 
from a private interest did the University place an offer of its own.246  
When the railroad rejected its offer in favor of another, the University 
then chose to proceed by eminent domain.247 
It is impossible to know whether the University’s pre-take conduct 
influenced the judge’s decision.  The written opinion does not cite 
this behavior as a factor for finding lack of necessity.  Yet, it poses the 
potential for a public relations nightmare simply by characterizing 
the University as imposing heavy-handed tactics because it failed to 
play by the rules of the commercial marketplace and submit a suffi-
ciently competitive offer.  A savvy landowner could also contend that 
it was the University’s own sluggishness in failing to act promptly 
when it first learned of the intent to sell that caused its failure to ob-
tain the property through ordinary means.  Using eminent domain as 
an escape hatch for failure in the open market does not create a 
sympathetic government entity. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For far too long, necessity doctrine has remained the dormant 
doctrine of eminent domain.  While the necessity requirement has 
been largely ignored, the public use requirement has received signifi-
cant attention.  In the wake of the Kelo decision and the broad discre-
tion of eminent domain power that case brings, the public use re-
quirement has been largely neutered as a meaningful check on 
condemnation power. 
Necessity remains one of the few tools available.  In spite of the 
opportunities that necessity doctrine brings, there has been virtually 
no attention paid to this aspect of eminent domain law.  Few attor-
neys representing landowners appear to raise a necessity challenge.  
Even fewer scholars discuss the requirement in depth.  The doctrine 
is in need of revival. 
 
244 See id. (“The University of Minnesota claims to have been interested in acquiring the 
property since 1992 . . . . On several occasions in the subsequent two or three years, rep-
resentatives from the University and the Railroad discussed the property.”). 
245 See id. at 579–80 (“In October 1994, after the University had obtained two appraisals of 
the Railroad’s property, the University became aware that the Railroad had received a 
purchase offer from another party.”). 
246 Id. at 580. 
247 See id. (“In early 1995, the University learned that the Railroad had rejected its offer and 
had accepted an offer from CSM Investments, Inc. (CSM) to purchase the property. . . .  
The University filed a petition to acquire the property by eminent domain in April 
1995.”). 
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The first step towards a meaningful discussion must be an under-
standing of its interpretation.  Currently, most necessity challenges 
are unsuccessful.  This does not necessarily mean, however, that ne-
cessity must remain dormant.  Courts have been willing to stop tak-
ings on the grounds that the condemning agency lacked sufficient 
necessity.  Ranging from a lack of plan specificity to the presence of 
regulatory barriers, there are a number of grounds upon which tak-
ings may be challenged for lack of necessity.  The problem has been 
that these cases are few and far between, are scattered across time 
and jurisdiction, and have been left out of the larger discussion of the 
appropriate limits of eminent domain. 
This Article takes a modest first step toward reviving necessity as a 
meaningful check on eminent domain power.  The cases in this Arti-
cle and inferences arising from them go some way toward under-
standing what courts will and will not accept as sufficient necessity.  It 
also shows examples of condemning agencies proceeding with tak-
ings, perhaps overconfidently, with little evidence or support for its 
need.  Necessity doctrine will not, and should not, grind all but the 
most essential of eminent domain proceedings to a halt.  Rather, 
what a revived doctrine could do at the very least is cause condemn-
ing agencies to pause at least briefly and consider possible options be-
fore initiating condemnation of a parcel.  Justice Brandeis once wrote 
that sunshine was the best disinfectant.248  The glare of greater trans-
parency in eminent domain proceedings can improve objective mu-
nicipal decision making and subject proceedings to public scrutiny 
and debate.  If necessity doctrine can serve this purpose, and perhaps 
a more aggressive role under certain circumstances, it will play an 
important role in curbing the excesses of an extraordinary govern-
ment power. 
 
248 See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914) 
(“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants . . . .”).  The book also discusses the 
hoarding of wealth by a corporate elite. 
